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 Introduction 1
On April 24, 2013 the world witnessed the collapse of Rana Plaza in Bangladesh. The pre-
vious day the factory had been evacuated due to large cracks in the walls, but on April 24, 
the workers were forcefully made to continue their work. More than 1,100 lost their lives 
and over 2,000 were injured (Daly 2015). It was not the first disaster at a Bangladeshi fac-
tory, but it was the worst (Pearshouse 2013). As the disaster unraveled, a situation with 
horrible working conditions, physical abuse, and slave-like wages was revealed. When 
searching for survivors, labels from over 20 multinational corporations (MNCs) were 
found, revealing that Rana Plaza had been a production site for large brands like Primark, 
Wal-Mart, and Benetton (Clean Clothes Campaign 2015).  
 
Following the disaster one was left with the question on distribution of responsibility. Was 
it the responsibility of the Bangladeshi government? Was it the responsibility of the factory 
owner? Was it the responsibility of the companies using the factory? Or was it a combina-
tion? As such, Rana Plaza is a good illustration of a contemporary challenge in the protec-
tion of human rights; balancing obligations and securing effective protection. Given that 
the human rights system was established as a response to massive human rights violations 
by States during WWII, one may argue that it is not reflective of today’s situation. In fact, 
some argue that “economic globalization…ha(s) rendered a state-centered focus obsolete,” 
as MNCs may hold larger economies than low-income states (Andreassen 2010:150). Fur-
ther, MNCs have been given a central role in development, taking on responsibilities previ-
ously allocated to states (Deva 2012:3). Consequently, one risks a situation where human 
rights exist in practice, but cannot be translated into action. To reduce this risk, demands 
for a global treaty on business and human rights have grown (HRC 2014b).  
 
In light of these developments, and considering the challenge of balancing rights and re-
sponsibilities, a question arises:  
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How do we best regulate MNCs to secure greater human rights protection?  
 
This is the overarching research question for the following analysis. To address the re-
search question, the paper takes an interdisciplinary, human rights approach and assesses 
three questions. First, based on the assumption that one has to move away from a state-
centered focus, it asks if there is a protection gap in the current system. In order for there to 
be a need to alter regulation there has to be a gap in protection. If there is no gap in protec-
tion, we should already have the answer to how we best regulate MNCs. Second, it asks 
whether corporate or sectorial standards can be an alternative to a global treaty regulating 
States and corporations. As the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted a resolution on 
the initiation of work on a global treaty (HRC 2014b), answering this question will also 
comment on whether or not a global treaty is the best way to go to increase protection of 
human rights. Third, in order to evaluate the possible impact of a treaty on a protection gap, 
it asks whether treaties, here represented by the Framework Convention on Tobacco Con-
trol (FWCTC), have an effect on the development of domestic legislation. As the FWCTC 
gives direct obligations for business based on human rights concerns about public health, 
e.g. limiting advertising to reduce consumption, it serves as a good sample in the discussion 
on a global treaty. If the FWCTC generates change in legislation this gives support for the 
strength of a treaty and its ability to increase the protection of human rights. Generally, in 
answering these, the overarching question is considered through the lens of the current de-
bate on whether or not to push global treaty.  
 
Throughout the text, the (global) system on business and human rights refers to the direct 
obligations on corporations with regards to human rights. As such, indirect obligations, and 
International Human Right Law (IHRL) not relating to corporations specifically, are not 
included in the term. One could argue that these are part of the system, however as this 
analysis primarily assess business standards the definition has been confined. Further, to 
reflect the diversity of actors, corporation, company, business and MNC are used inter-
changeably to denote business.  
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1.1 Regulatory Challenges 
IHRL establishes the obligation of States to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights of their 
population (ESC 1987:24). This includes negative obligations on non-interference, as well 
as positive obligations on enhancing protection. Consequently, in the case of Rana Plaza, 
the Bangladeshi government had an obligation to effectively protect the workers, and hold 
the factory owner responsible. While the government did do the latter, arresting owner So-
hel Rana and four other factory owners operating in the same building (BBC 2013), victims 
and their families have faced difficulties in securing compensation. Further, there have 
been limited improvements on the working conditions in other factories, indicating an in-
adequacy (or lack of will) of the Bangladeshi government in addressing the issue (HRW 
2014:2).  
 
Where IHRL sets out the obligations of states, distribution of responsibility to multinational 
corporations (MNCs) is less clear. The 2011 UN Guiding Principles (UNGPs) establishes a 
corporate responsibility to respect and remedy human rights, but this is not legally binding 
(HRC 2014: para 14). As will be shown, most efforts to regulate business have been of a 
voluntary character. An exception is the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnation-
al Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN 
Norms)(ESC 2003); however these we not adopted, presumably due to strong language and 
legal character (Deva 2012:104f). In the case of Rana Plaza, a fund has been established to 
ensure corporate contributions to compensation for victims. The goal was to secure 30 mil-
lion dollars, but two years later 9 million are still pending. Additionally, not all of the 
MNCs have contributed and many refuse to reveal the size of their contribution (Clean 
Clothes Campaign 2015). Beyond financial remedies pushed through by Civil Society Or-
ganizations (CSOs), there are limited consequences for the corporations. Consequently, 
even though safeguards exist, one may arguably question the sufficiency of these protec-
tions. 
 
While right holders are struggling to find support for their complaints, a system has devel-
oped which gives protection to corporations in their international relations with states. Un-
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der international investment law, corporations have been given the right to bring consenting 
states in front of international arbitration tribunals. Arbitration tribunals are left to their 
own discretion to consider whether human rights obligations of states are valid arguments 
for regulatory or legislative action, resulting in a variety of approaches.
1
 As a result, some 
tribunals find that corporate interests weigh heavier than human rights.
2
 Arguably, consid-
ering how a protection on investors and corporations from state violations has developed, 
one should also be able to protect right holders from corporate violations despite regulatory 
challenges. This supports an assumption of a protection gap, with victims of human rights 
abuses as the losing party. 
 
However, one should keep in mind that business can also be good for human rights. Where 
states are violating human rights, the introduction of MNCs can increase protection. Eco-
nomic development spurred by corporate investments can lead to a better protection of 
rights – the trickle-down effect (Andreassen 2010:152). This line of reasoning is visible in 
the discourse of the business sector. In Norway, it is argued that domestic corporations 
bring Norwegian values with them when operating abroad – human rights being one of 
these (ILPI 2014:7f). This can be seen in conjunction with the idea that investment in a 
rights-violating state is likely to spur economic growth and corporations’ central role in the 
economic and social development of states (Deva 2012:3f). Unfortunately, empirical evi-
dence on the impact of investments is not unambiguously clear, pointing to a possible need 
for regulation (Colen et al. 2013:115). 
1.2 Adapting to New Challenges 
A response to regulatory challenges regarding corporations has been to introduce interna-
tional standards regulating business on human rights as well as social and environmental 
issues. The OECD and the ILO were early in adopting policies addressing these challenges. 
                                                 
 
1
 Compare CMS v. Argentina LG&E v. Argentina. 
2
 See St. Elena. v. Costa Rica. 
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In 1976, the first version of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises was pub-
lished (OECD 2011), and in the following year the ILO issued their Tri-partite Declaration 
of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (ILO 2014). Since 
then there has been a proliferation of standards in a variety of forms. Efforts within the UN 
include the Global Compact in 2000 (Global Compact 2000), the UN Norms in 2003 (ESC 
2003), and the work of the Special Representative for the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises (SRSG) in 2008 
and 2011 (HRC 2008a; HRC 2011). The latter being the UNGPs, which have been at the 
focus of most debates following 2011. 
 
Further, in 2014 the HRC passed two resolutions on business and human rights (BHR). The 
first resolution requests elaboration of an international legally binding instrument and was 
brought by Ecuador, South Africa, Venezuela, and Cuba (HRC 2014b). Building on the 
language of the SRSG with corporate responsibility to respect human rights, the draft reso-
lution calls for the creation of binding regulation on corporations grounded in the human 
rights framework. The second resolution is an elaboration of implementation of the UNGPs 
brought by twenty-two states under the leadership of Norway (HRC 2014a). It recognizes 
challenges with implementation of the UNGPs, but stresses their value, aiming to increase 
implementation and focusing efforts rather than creating a new regulatory system. The con-
tent of these resolutions illustrates one of the largest debates in the field of BHR; whether 
or not one should push for a global treaty.  
 
Theoretically this debate can be seen as a discussion between proponents of responsive 
regulation and proponents of deterrence. Responsive regulation supports a soft approach to 
the regulation of business (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992:35). It argues for flexible self-
regulation of corporations, adaptable to different structures and settings. If there is a reoc-
currence of violations reflecting ineffective regulation, stronger mechanisms will be en-
forced until one reaches a point where it “becomes rational to comply” (Braithwaite 
2011:484). On the other end of the scale are the proponents of deterrence. Deterrence theo-
ry assumes that hard regulation with hard sanctions will induce compliance simply through 
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the threat of their existence (Fisse 1982). In order to secure effective sanctions, one needs 
an international regime which facilitates their enforcement. In the intersection between the 
theoretical assumptions, Deva (2012) argues for an integrated approach to regulation of 
corporations. Critiquing the theory of responsive regulation he argues for using hard and 
soft mechanisms of enforcement in “a synergy between persuasion and punishment” (Deva 
2012:193). In his view, this enables a more effective use of the mechanisms, and eliminates 
the strategic calculation of costs the responsive regulation allows for through the predicta-
bility of development in enforcement. A central argument is the necessity of integrating 
human rights issues with business issues in an effort to humanize business, i.e. make com-
panies comply with their obligations on human rights. Reflecting on the international trade 
and investment regime, the integrated theory aims at rectifying “asymmetries between 
rights and responsibilities for corporations” (Deva 2012:196). Through assessing existing 
standards from a human rights perspective, this paper contributes to the debate on which 
approach is preferable by reflecting on empirical evidence of how the system is working.  
1.3 Hypotheses and Structure 
Central to the discussion on whether or not there is a need for a binding treaty is the debate 
on how to best regulate corporate behavior - through binding or voluntary guidelines. In 
order to decide how best to move forward to protect right-holders, an understanding of how 
the system is currently working is key. To address these issues, the following analysis re-
flects on three main questions: Is there an international protection gap? What are the alter-
natives to a binding treaty? Do international treaties have an impact? 
1.3.1 Is there an international protection gap? 
The need for an international treaty on BHR is reliant on acceptance of the assumption that 
the current system holds a protection gap with regards to human rights. An initial analysis 
consequently has to assess this question and identify what the system looks like – beyond 
the protections of the UNGPs. Consequently, this paper analyzes the system as a whole; 
describing characteristics and analyzing the implications. Given the assumption that corpo-
rations can be a positive contribution to rights protection, and knowing that some interna-
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tional standards are directly aimed at corporations by corporations, the protection gap could 
possibly be covered.  
 
Chapter three addresses this question by analyzing trends in the adoption and content of 
global standards on human rights. Despite the current debate on binding or voluntary 
guidelines there is little empirical research in the field. The launch of the business and hu-
man rights company- and governmental action platform by the Business and Human Rights 
Resource Centre (BHRRC 2015) is a step towards further insight into how corporations 
adapt to the UNGPs, but more work is necessary. As the use of international standards has 
become increasingly popular, an analysis of their content and scope will be a valuable tool 
in understanding what today’s regulatory system is and how corporations respond to it. By 
getting an overview of the system and which protections exist, one is better equipped to 
decide how to move forwards. Consequently, a database has been constructed to facilitate a 
comparative quantitative analysis of adopted standards. A review of existing research and 
theories on adoption of human rights treaties and international standards is followed by an 
empirical analysis of the collected data.  
1.3.2 What are the alternatives to a binding treaty?  
Having identified major trends in the contemporary system of international standards, some 
alternatives to the question of corporate regulations appear. One would assume that a bind-
ing treaty on corporations would be signed by states. Further, the statement on elaboration 
of the binding treaty indicates that the treaty would be universal in scope (HRC 2014b). 
However, based on the character of current standards and theories of corporate commit-
ment to human rights, an alternative with corporate-driven or sectorial standards might be 
as effective (Campbell 2007:953). In order to assess whether or not a binding treaty is the 
better option, one has to look into whether alternatives give an opportunity to secure a 
stronger protection of rights. Subsequently, question two leads to two different sub-
questions both addressed in chapter four.  
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The first sub-question relates to the standards drafted and adopted by corporations. How do 
corporate driven standards protect against human rights violations? A theory on commit-
ment assumes that corporations are more likely to comply if they have been part of the 
drafting process, and if it is an expression of self-regulation (Fransen 2012:176). Conse-
quently, looking at the coverage of corporate standards and comparing them to other alter-
natives on scope, strength, and drafting allows us to identify differences. Further testing 
what explains the variance on corporate commitment will be indicative as to whether cor-
porate standards are a strong and viable alternative to a binding treaty.  
 
The second sub-question concerns sectorial standards. How do sectorial standards protect 
against human rights violations? A possible strength of sectorial standards is that they al-
low for protection of sector specific issues. Based on the assumption of the possibility to 
tailor protections to risks, one could assume that sectorial standards hold stronger, but less 
human rights protections – consequently impacting its design. In order to assess whether it 
is a viable alternative, the sectorial standards are compared against each other as well as the 
possibility of a global treaty. Sectorial development can be an important factor as it indi-
cates difference in protection across sectors. Tests are run for human rights language, en-
forcement, and coverage.  
1.3.3 Do international standards have an impact? 
A last question raised is whether current international standards have an impact on the be-
havior of States and corporations, and accordingly the protection of human rights. Through 
a literature review and a case study of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Con-
trol (FWCTC), the analysis in chapter five examines the legislative effects, i.e. adoption of 
new legislation, of its adoption and ratification. Using data on Gross National Income 
(GNI), mean years of education, human development, implementation of laws, and tracing 
development towards ratification of the FWCTC one can assess possible effects of ratifica-
tion (Helfer and Voeten 2014). Further disaggregation on region and wealth introduces 
control variables which may enable a more statistically significant result and allow for a 
greater explanation of variance. 
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 Methodology  2
As the overall aim of the paper is to make an empirical contribution to the discussion on 
how the international society should proceed to increase protection of victims of human 
rights abuses, the paper takes a quantitative approach. To facilitate progress in protection, 
the analysis has to reflect on how the system is evolving and a general approach looking at 
existing trends and progress enables this. Quantitative analysis gives room to “disprove 
commonly held assumptions about human rights” (Meyers 1996:382). Given the lack of 
empirical approaches to BHR this may be necessary. If it turns out that corporate driven 
standards include as strong a human rights protection as multi-stakeholder or state-driven 
approaches, this could change the discourse, laying the groundwork for an alternative theo-
ry of effective human rights protection. The causality of why these trends occur can only be 
covered to a limited extent in the quantitative analysis as it identifies varying degrees of 
explanatory factors. However, following this empirical discussion, a qualitative assessment 
of protections could increase the validity of the argumentation as well as understanding of 
the current challenges. 
 
While quantitative analysis requires a simplification of issues, and may limit an in-depth 
understanding of a particular standard, it is well suited for a comparable analysis. Given the 
aim of identifying general trends, a qualitative approach would limit the explanatory effect 
as it is difficult to make general assumptions based on a small sample or narrower study. 
Qualitative studies could be conducted following this analysis to assess the fit and strength 
of the predictions made. Beyond allowing for a comparison, benefits of quantification in-
clude limited selection bias and an extensive scope (Landman 2002:919ff). Although the 
analysis compares standards and not states, it relies on similar strategies of measurement. 
Further, transparent quantification simplifies falsification through replicability of the re-
sults.  
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However, there are some challenges to the use of quantitative methods. First, while it al-
lows for identification of trends, it has limited ability to explain the actual situation in the 
protection of rights at the individual level (Green 2001:1078f). Consequently, one is unable 
to capture to what degree corporations are following the standards – or corporate compli-
ance with the standards. This is particularly an issue where there are insufficient mecha-
nisms that monitor behavior (Laufer 2003). A second challenge of quantification is the 
ability to secure relevant, valid, reliable, simple, timely, and objective information which 
both allows for comparisons and disaggregation (Yamin and Falb 2012:358). In light of the 
challenges, Deva (2012:2) argues that one cannot feasibly conduct an evaluation of all reg-
ulatory initiatives on corporations. Reflecting on amongst other the difference in their de-
sign, scope, and capture, he takes a qualitative approach to assessing their effect. While 
Deva does raise some important points, one can arguably conduct a comparative analysis of 
standards to identify trends. Through operationalizing characteristics of structure and hu-
man rights protections, one can make general assumption.  
2.1 Database  
In order to address the question of a global system, a database has been assembled. The 
database is newly constructed and codifies international standards on business and human 
rights. It consists of 46 variables including strength, human rights inclusion, certification, 
reporting, reference to other international documents or standards, fragmentation, drafting - 
and adopting parties.
3
 As the first source which holds quantifiable information on interna-
tional standards on business and human rights, it speaks to the debate on business regula-
tion offering an empirical approach. This database serves as the empirical foundation for 
chapters three and four.  
 
Standards included in the database are defined as international standards, which can be 
explicitly applied to the business sector. As the standards have to explicitly apply to busi-
                                                 
 
3
 See Annex IV for Coding Manual. 
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ness, instruments like ICESCR are excluded from the standards specifically analyzed to 
differentiate between direct and indirect effect of regulations. Further, the limitation to in-
ternational standards excludes sole and unilateral jurisdictional ones – including regulations 
within the EU, and exclusively bilateral standards. Even though exclusively bilateral stand-
ards are excluded from the analysis, standards which open up for adoption or adherence by 
other parties in other jurisdictions have been included as they are considered either to have 
or aspire to an international scope. A last criterion for inclusion is that it has to refer to so-
cial responsibility. Considering the vast amount of standards and agreements that regulate 
corporate behavior in different operational spheres, this allows for limiting the selection 
size and tailoring the analysis.  
 
The collection of data was a collaborative effort initiated as a research project aimed at 
identifying how many global standards actually address corporate responsibility for human 
rights. The standards were taken from a spreadsheet developed by Natasha Telson, Daniela 
Kistler and Malcolm Langford and slightly supplemented by extra research. The methodol-
ogy for selecting and coding the sample was developed by me and Malcolm Langford. Re-
lying on the abovementioned definition of global standards, the data reflects existing uni-
versal, sectorial, and sub-sectorial standards. The standards have been randomly selected 
through an inductive method, and should not be considered an all-inclusive sample. Further 
research should aim at strengthening the database allowing for an even broader understand-
ing of the current system.  
2.2 Testing Impact 
Chapter five is an attempt to merge the gap between the development of international 
trends and the actual impact of standards. Although relying on quantitative method as op-
posed to a qualitative approach, it broadens the explanatory power of the analysis. The 
FWCTC was a strategic choice as it has near universal ratification, is binding, and allows 
for time-based comparison.  
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To assess the impact, data on tobacco control laws has been analyzed up against the pro-
cess of drafting, negotiating, adopting and ratification of the FWCTC. Using dummy varia-
bles, the analysis tests the development of legislation towards these critical points in time 
for the FWCTC. Based on the presumption on the development of domestic legislation as a 
response to international regulation, this will allow one to assess if there are correlations 
between the development of domestic and international law (Helfer and Voeten 2014:15ff). 
Although a correlation is an indication of causality, the analysis cannot establish this for 
certain. Checking for control variables can strengthen the analysis, but the result is not con-
clusive. The collection and coding of data will be further addressed in chapter five.  
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 Is There a Protection Gap? 3
With the UNGPs, the SRSG operationalized the “Protect, Respect, and Remedy Frame-
work” (PRR) developed in 2008 (HRC 2008a). Attempting to bridge the current interna-
tional standards with the regulatory framework on states, the SRSG and the UNGPs have 
become central in the debate on BHR. Taking a conceptual approach, the framework elabo-
rates on the state duty to protect, the corporate responsibility to respect, and the joint obli-
gation to remedy violations. In the discussion, the SRSG supports the argument of a protec-
tion gap triggered by globalization, and reflects on the threat of over-expanding markets 
(HRC 2008a: para 11).  
 
The UNGPs describe state responsibility to shape corporate culture, and secure policy 
alignment between the different government ministries and the overall implementation of 
human rights obligations. The corporate responsibility to respect is separated from the state 
obligation to protect on the grounds of differing responsibility. It further argues for an in-
dependent corporate responsibility to avoid the distinction of primary and secondary obli-
gations (HRC 2008a:17). An important difference between the corporate and state respon-
sibility is that the SRSG limits the corporate responsibility to “do no harm,” both through 
direct impact, but also through leverage or control over actors which do harm.
4
 This differ-
entiation of responsibility reflects the abovementioned state-focused international law, 
which one could argue is inadequately equipped to deal with the expanding threat of non-
state actors (Alston 2005:4).  
 
                                                 
 
4
 Additionally, the SRSG shifted the focus “from obligations…to states’ policy rationales to protect human 
rights in their international relations” (emphasis added) (Augenstein and Kinley 2013:273). However, there 
is no consensus on this issue, and the discussion on extraterritorial obligation of states is ongoing (See Lang-
ford 2012:1180f). 
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Although the UNGPs may have had the effect of unifying a complex system of BHR, they 
do not give a holistic image of how individuals are protected against violations, how corpo-
rations are regulated or committed to protection, or the scope of state responsibility. The 
development of international standards both prior to and following their adoption is an ex-
pression of how actors are adapting to new challenges. This chapter will describe the struc-
ture and foundation of the system of standards, to address the overall question of whether 
or not there is a protection gap on individual human rights. First it discusses the theoretical 
expectations of a protection gap, before elaborating on the method. The analysis and 
presentation of data discuss how the current system reflects the theoretical expectations and 
the implications of the findings. Hence, the overarching alternative hypothesis for this 
chapter is that there is a protection gap in today’s system.  
3.1 Theoretical Approaches 
In order to assess whether or not there is a protection gap one has to understand which pro-
tections exist. As emphasized above, the current system of human rights protection is state-
centric. States have the obligation to protect, respect, and fulfil human rights within the 
scope of application of treaties to which they are parties.
5
 However, some protections are 
guaranteed regardless of ratification – ius cogens norms and human rights in customary 
international law. An implication for legal obligations is that where states neglect to uphold 
their responsibility, individuals hold a legitimate claim against the state. Although one 
would not argue that the current system effectively guarantees universal protection of all 
human rights, as no state perfectly protects their population from all human rights viola-
tions, the responsibility of the state is clear. Consequently one could argue that any viola-
tion committed by a corporation is a result of the state in question’s lack of protection of 
rights. Taking this approach, one could disregard the question of a protection gap. Howev-
er, there are issues which merit further discussion.  
                                                 
 
5
 To be discussed further in the following sub-section. 
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3.1.1 Protection of Human Rights 
While some human rights treaties are almost universally ratified, there are variances. The 
USA for example is reluctant to ratify conventions with economic, social, and cultural 
rights, while China has yet to ratify the ICCPR. Deviation in ratification can arguably entail 
a protection gap, and can become a challenge as MNCs operate across borders. Expecta-
tions on corporations may vary greatly from their home state to their host state, and one 
may face difficulties when assessing which regulation to follow (De Schutter 2013:XX). 
Further, this may influence where corporations chose to register and where they chose to do 
business, ultimately affecting right-holders. 
 
Even though states are primary duty bearers, specific articles and provisions within existing 
instruments link responsibility, or the ability to violate rights, to business. CEDAW, CRC, 
and CRPD all reference specific risks or obligations to mitigate violations by entities other 
than states.
6
 Further, several UN treaty bodies have elaborated on the necessity to mitigate; 
the Human Rights Committee (CCPR 2004: para 8), the Committee on ICESCR (ESC 
2002: para 23), and the Committee on the CRC (CRC 2013: para 8). However, although 
they all recognize a specific threat related to corporate abuse, the protections are an expres-
sion of the system’s focus on state responsibility, reflecting the state-centric nature of the 
human rights system. This approach is also visible in the domestic sphere. In their recom-
mendation to Total, and repeated in Wal-Mart, the Norwegian Council of Ethics stated that 
“Only states can violate human rights directly. Companies can, as indicated in paragraph 
4.4 [of the ethical guidelines], contribute to human rights violations committed by states. 
The Fund may in its turn contribute to companies’ complicity through its ownership” 
(Chesterman 2011:56).
7
 This interpretation reflects the assumption that it is states, not cor-
porations, which violate human rights.  
 
                                                 
 
6
 CEDAW art 2(e); CRC art 32; CRPD art 4(e). 
7
 Total S.A. Recommendation section 3.1; Wal-Mart Recommendation. 
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In spite of the argued protection gap, the SRSG does not identify a corporate obligation to 
respect, only a responsibility. This distinction is important because where responsibility 
refers to a voluntary or moral commitment, an obligation is legally binding. Relying on an 
argumentation where corporate responsibility is grounded on their place in society, the 
SRSG emphasizes that “…business enterprises… (are) required to comply with all applica-
ble laws and to respect human rights.” (HRC 2011:6) In the operationalization of the 
framework, the SRSG specifies that the UNGPs do not create or attempt to create new in-
ternational obligations on business. Despite the SRSG’s rejection of the assumption that 
corporations have an obligation, there is no consensus on this issue. Reflecting on develop-
ing domestic law and international customary law, Deva (2012) argues for a trend towards 
acceptance of corporate obligations, beyond profit maximization. Through unpacking the 
structure of corporations, he argues that corporations are “aggregation(s) of individuals 
glued together” (Deva 2012:146); emphasizing how individuals have obligations they 
should not cease to hold simply because they started to act together as corporation. 
 
Perhaps one of the most challenging issues in this discussion on attribution of responsibility 
is piercing the “corporate veil” (Mestad 2011:84). The corporate veil refers to the structur-
ing of MNCs with subsidiaries in separate jurisdictions, making it difficult to allocate re-
sponsibility for violations. It can appear as though MNCs are securing limited liability and 
avoiding regulatory initiatives to reduce the likelihood of being linked to and held respon-
sible for violations (Mestad 2011:88). Due to the fact that corporate entities are registered 
in different states and consequently jurisdictions, becoming separate legal entities, a major 
challenge is finding the right jurisdiction to hear claims. If one establishes jurisdiction over 
one entity, one has to establish and prove a string of commands; “this legal leeway ipso 
facto makes MNCs difficult regulatory targets” (Deva 2012:50). Consequently, in order to 
address the challenge of appropriate jurisdiction, proponents of a legally binding document 
argue for extraterritorial state obligations (Deva and Bilschitz 2013:23). 
 
Higgins addresses the issue of contemporary challenges of regulating corporations. She 
argues that due to the developments within international law, and particularly within the 
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frame of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and arbitration, corporations do have the abil-
ity to bear international responsibility, as they have become actors in the field (Higgins in 
Ruggie 2007:8). The expansions of the international protections of MNCs addressed by 
Higgins hold specific protections against state abuse. These protections are based on the 
presumption that the rule of law within the host state is not satisfactory, and that additional 
protection of investments are necessary (Dolzer and Schreuer 2012). The distrust of fair 
protection within the domestic sphere of the host state is argued to be the primary motiva-
tional factor for upholding the current system of international investment law, including the 
necessity of maintaining investor-state dispute settlement rather than using domestic courts. 
Following this argumentation from a human rights perspective is difficult. If a corporation 
assumes that the state in which they are investing does not have a fair legal system, how 
can one expect that an individual victim of a human rights abuse stemming from the in-
vestment will get fair remedies? Arguably this can represent a protection gap.  
 
However, there are some challenges to balancing corporate and state responsibility. Alston 
(2005:4ff) argues that it will be difficult to distinguish who should bear the responsibility, 
and when. If a corporation violates its responsibility to respect human rights, is it the failure 
of the state to protect or the failure of the corporations to respect? A consequence of the 
distribution of responsibility could be to exempt states from their obligation to the detri-
ment of corporations. It is beyond doubt that states are still primary violators of human 
rights, and any distribution of responsibility has to not only be legally grounded, but also 
take possible consequences into account.  
3.1.2 International Standards and Voluntary Self-regulation 
International standards differ on legal, political, and economic strength. Relying on a legal 
approach, Deva takes the starting point that current regulatory regimes are “inadequate to 
make companies accountable for human rights abuses” (Deva 2012:46). Reflecting on the 
theory of responsive regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992) he argues that the regulatory 
power over corporations is limited due to, amongst other, inequality in power and challeng-
es in identifying corporate motives. Assuming insufficient protection, the argument is that 
18 
 
one has to put in place a binding international framework, which can be strengthened and 
specified at institutional and domestic level (Deva 2012). While recognizing current chal-
lenges to the system, the SRSG disagrees with the necessity to create an international 
framework which is binding on corporations. Taking a polycentric approach, he holds that 
the current global system is only - and should only be, binding on states. He argues that the 
responsibility of corporations should be enforced through domestic legislation, while main-
taining the development of international voluntary guidelines (HRC 2008a:15f).  
 
Including spheres of political influence and impact, the SRSG’s approach connects state 
and corporate responsibility through positive reinforcement (HRC 2008:10). The mutual 
push towards strengthened protection could in some ways reflect on Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s’ (1992) reflexive approach, where the protections adapt to upcoming chal-
lenges through gradual strengthening. However, a polycentric approach could arguably be 
more pro-active in character than the reflexive adaptation. Based on a polycentric approach 
to the global system one could establish that the strengths of the human rights protection 
are more nuanced than binding – voluntary.8 Dynamic interpretation of the provision held 
within an international standard or international law, may influence its human rights protec-
tion. Consequently, quasi-judicial or non-judicial mechanisms can greatly impact law (Tay-
lor 2011:11). Taking this approach gives strength to the SRSGs argument of mutual rein-
forcement. Similarly, standards which allow for interpretation of its provisions may adapt 
to legal developments. The inclusion of new protections in the framework could indicate 
acceptance of the responsibility. Linking the standard to the right could be interpreted as a 
movement towards a more binding character of the human rights protections. In the consid-
eration of a polycentric approach to regulation, time is of vital importance. In order for the 
system to progress towards better protection, the development must run its course. Conse-
quently, there is still a gap in protection, which may or may not be addressed in the near 
future.  
                                                 
 
8
 See also Prenkert and Shackelford (2014). 
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As most of the international standards are voluntary in scope, they can be considered as an 
expression of voluntary self-regulation. Consequently, economists of the Chicago School 
might argue that they hold inherent challenges (Lessig 1998). From the view of rational 
choice theory, self-regulation is limited in character due to the lack of effective enforce-
ment of non-compliance (Campbell 2007; Posner 1998). Going even further in the lack of 
belief in the international system, Posner (2014:59) argues that legally binding obligations 
on states expressed through international treaties does not contribute to an improved pro-
tection of rights. However, there is no consensus on the limited or non-existing impact of 
binding or voluntary obligations. Accepting legal limitations to enforcement of voluntary 
self-regulation, Leisinger (2006:11) argues that introduction of effective methods or moni-
toring may enhance the effect of self-regulation – particularly if it is comparable to other 
corporations. Following this approach, the system of international standards may hold bet-
ter protection than a strict legal positivist or rational choice argument would assume. 
3.1.3 Which Human Rights to Include? 
Issues that arise when discussing the current system relate to how the obligations of corpo-
rations should be designed, and which human rights should be included. The UN Norms 
argues for an approach which makes corporations responsible for violations within their 
“spheres of influence” (ESC 2003: para 1). The SRSG elaborates on the UN Norms’ 
spheres of influence, linking it to direct impact of its operations and the power the corpora-
tion holds over other actors (HRC 2008a:19). This inclusion of impact beyond direct opera-
tions has consequences for how one perceives corporate responsibility and which human 
rights to include. The UN Norms and the interpretation by the SRSG expand the under-
standing of stakeholders beyond worker and shareholder concerns. As such, the SRSG 
takes a holistic approach, and argues for the inclusion of all human rights – i.e. the protec-
tions in the international human rights treaties and the UDHR (HRC 2008a).
9
 Given the 
                                                 
 
9
 CERD, ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, CAT, CRC, CMW, CED, CRPD. 
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consensus on the UNGPs an expansive approach that takes both spheres into account seems 
appropriate. 
 
The holistic approach of the SRSG, arguing that a limitation to a specific group of rights 
will result in loss of protection, stands in opposition to the approach of realist political sci-
entists like Michael Ignatieff. Ignatieff holds that in order to secure corporate compliance, 
one should limit the scope to particular rights relevant to the specific sector, sub-sector, or 
business (Posner 2014:94f). The SRSGs argumentation reflects the stakeholder approach of 
the variety of effected stakeholders of corporate actions – beyond shareholders and em-
ployees. However, the following review of existing standards reveals a tendency to limit 
the understanding of corporate responsibility to that of its workers. This could be linked to 
the argumentation of effectiveness policy framing (Sullivan and Hachez 2012). Without a 
substantive reference to particular rights, and primarily referring to the general respect for 
human rights, one can risk dissolution of substantive protections. In the report on the PRR 
Framework, the SRSG presents a list of human rights claims from over 300 cases (HRC 
2008b). Although this list should not be considered as exhaustive of all possible human 
rights violations, it is a good indication that a more expansive approach to business respon-
sibility is necessary (HRC 2008a: para 52).  
3.2 Method 
In order to identify trends in regulation, this chapter analyzes descriptive statistics of stand-
ards. As specified in the previous chapter, the sample should not be considered exhaustive. 
The data collected includes 59 independent standards not counting revisions and 82 stand-
ards when revisions are included. Revisions are included in order to allow for time-based 
comparison. As there has been limited empirical research on the field to date, there is lim-
ited comparable data available.  
 
As the aim of this chapter is to identify core trends in the structure and characteristics of the 
current system, the data are presented in a descriptive manner. Due to the discussions on 
the existence of a protection gap, the alternative hypothesis is that there is a protection gap 
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with regards to human rights protection. If the gap exists, this will strengthen the argumen-
tation for the need of reform or development of the system of BHR. In order to assess 
whether there is a gap, the standards are compared on the inclusion of human rights, inclu-
sion of human rights treaties, adopting parties, its binding character, and methods of moni-
toring – specifically complaints, reporting, and certification.  
 
With regards to human rights, the system is characterized by the breadth of its human rights 
inclusion; 1) none or only specific, 2) partial inclusion, and 3) full inclusion. In order to be 
considered fully inclusive, the standard has to have its foundation in the international bill of 
rights – a holistic approach to human rights. Standards which reference a substantial num-
ber of ILO Standards, specific international treaties, or a long list of substantial human 
rights, fall into the category of partial inclusion. Even though ILO conventions are closely 
connected to human rights, their focus on workers’ rights limits the holistic approach to the 
scope of protection, which is why they are coded as partial inclusion. Standards which only 
refer to specific human rights, or have no reference at all beyond a social responsibility, fall 
into the last category. Further, the human rights included in the standards are differentiated 
on whether or not they figure as a reference or a substantive protection. As there are no 
definite limits to the characterization of human rights inclusion, there may be difference of 
opinion on the classifications made. However, the standards have all been coded by the 
same person securing consistency and limiting the threat of inter-coder unreliability.  
3.3 What does the system look like? 
The database and subsequent analysis includes 82 international standards. With regards to 
scope, most are Global-Universal (39%), including standards like the UN Global Compact. 
These standards are applicable beyond a specific sector or region. Following close behind 
are the Global-Sectorial (37.8) standards like the Clean Clothes Campaign Code of Labour 
Practices for the Apparel Industry. While it addresses the apparel industry, it does not dif-
ferentiate between different sectors of production. The third most common group holds the 
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Global-Sub-Sectorial (17.1) standards like the International Code of Marketing of Breast-
Milk Substitutes, a sub-sector of food products. While Regional (6%) standards
10
 like the 
SGE21 Norm, are least represented in this analysis. Given that the primary aim is to ana-
lyze global standards, this should be considered an outcome of strategic sampling. More in-
depth characteristics of standards will be discussed in the following sub-chapters. 
3.3.1 Strength 
As expected, a great majority of the standards are voluntary regulatory initiatives. Of the 82 
standards included in the analysis, three were binding on corporations, three were charac-
terized as a combination of voluntary and binding requirements and the rest were volun-
tary. From a legal point of view, and following Deva (2012:46), this implies insufficient 
protection. Standards that have been characterized as voluntary may hold requirements that 
appear binding on some actors. However, binding refers to legally binding documents, 
which can (or should) be legally enforceable. Consequently, requirements which are man-
datory within a standard do not render it legally binding. All of the standards which are 
binding have states as adopting parties. Referring to the theoretical discussion of the state 
of international law above, this is a reflection of how it influences the development of hu-
man rights protections. Consistent with the discussion above, the voluntary protections of 
human rights strengthens the argumentation for the existence of a protection gap.  
 
However, following the argumentation of the benefit of polycentric regulation and political 
influence, the lack of binding regulations on corporations in itself does not establish a pro-
tection gap. Considering the argumentation of responsive regulation (Braithwaite 2011), 
international standards with political power may in fact yield greater effect than those that 
are legally binding. This is due to the fact that effective enforcement demands political or 
judicial will as well as sufficient sanctions. In order to approach a conclusion one has to 
consider if there has been movement on the human rights protection within existing stand-
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 Disaggregated as the universal standards. 
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ards, or comparatively between older and newer standards with the same target group. A 
movement will not equal an improvement in protection, but will help falsify a null hypoth-
esis claiming no impact of the international standards. Further, from an economic point of 
view the classification is similarly inconclusive on the effective impact. Rather, one would 
consider the existence of monitoring or certification mechanisms equally or more important 
than the legal characteristic of the standard itself. For example, if the lack of certification 
reduced the corporation’s access to the market, the economic cost of non-compliance may 
have greater effect on corporate behavior than a legal requirement (Auld et al. 2008:195).  
3.3.2 Growth and Human Rights Protection 
As shown in Graph 1, there has been a rapid growth in international standards. The first 
wave of standards appears between 1994 and 2000, with a short slow down before it keeps 
growing. However, as the database includes revisions, an additional line is added to show 
the growth in adoption of new standards. This reveals that while there has been an increase 
in standards following 2000, many of these are revisions. There is an increase in the 
amount of standards, but the growth rate is lower for new adoptions.  
 
 
Graph 1: Entry into Force (cumulative) 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2014
Int'l Standards
HR Inclusion
HR Full
Inclusion
No Revisions
HR No
Revisions
24 
 
Further, 1994 marks a point where the standards increasingly include partial or full human 
rights protections. As the HR Inclusion line indicates, the number of standards which hold 
human rights protection is rapidly growing. Comparing the growth of HR Inclusion and HR 
Full Inclusion reveals that full protection is a more recent phenomenon.  
 
Interestingly, when one includes revisions it seems as though there is an increasing gap 
between standards and inclusion of human rights. Comparatively, the distance between 
newly adopted standards and inclusion of human rights is smaller and more stable. This 
could be an indication that it is easier to include human rights at the outset of working with 
an international standard, while it may be more challenging to amend existing regulation. 
However, disaggregation of the nature of the standards and inclusion of human rights pro-
tection reveals that the majority of those that give full protection are revisions of existing 
standards; countering the assumption made above. The revisions are more equally distrib-
uted across the variety of human rights inclusion, while the original standards are more 
unevenly distributed.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Human Rights Inclusion 
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3.3.3 The Actors 
Considering the variety of the regime, who are the actors that structure it? In order to assess 
the actors, a distinction is made between those who draft and those who adopt the stand-
ards. The database refers to sixteen possible combinations of four different categories of 
actors; states, corporations, IGOs, and CSOs/NGOs. Figure 2 holds the distribution of the 
four categories and reveals that when the participation of actors is aggregated, corporations 
have signed more standards than any other group, while CSOs have been the most active 
drafters.  
 
The disaggregated data reflecting all the combinations reveal that corporations are the pri-
mary signatories and sole adopter of 30 percent of the standards – twice as much as states. 
 
Despite the targeting of standards for corporations, the drafting of standards is predomi-
nantly multi-stakeholder, i.e. drafted by more than one type or category of actor. With re-
gards to drafting, an all-inclusive process or cooperation between corporations and CSOs is 
most frequently used. From a political point of view a multi-stakeholder approach may 
hold greater influential power, with cross-issue actors (Auld et al. 2008). Although one 
might expect a correlation between active actors and time, the data does not support this 
assumption.  
States 
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ations 
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Figure 2: The Actors Drafting and Signing Standards 
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3.3.4 Sectors 
Approximately a third of the standards are sector specific. However three sectors dominate, 
representing over 70 percent. As shown in Figure 3 on the next page, the three most regu-
lated sectors are; agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying, and manufactur-
ing. While agriculture, mining, and manufacturing have multiple regulations, most sectors 
have no sectorial regulation at all.
11
 Although there are challenges to identifying causes for 
the different sectorial approaches from the data, it is interesting to note that the most regu-
lated sectors are the ones that dominate the global trade market (World Bank 2015a). Regu-
lation on services on the other hand, a primary driver of GDP in most developed states 
(World Bank 2015b), is limited. Following the argumentation of the SRSG that the rein-
forcing nature of standards and regulations will drive increase in protection (HRC 
2008a:10), one could argue that the sectorial development within certain sectors is the re-
sult of efforts to close the gap. Fransen (2012:171) argues that an increase in standards 
could also imply a “race to the bottom” in regulation – creating new standards with a nar-
rower protection, due to the increase in competition for market capture. 
 
An interesting observation on the most regulated sectors is that these are industries in 
which environmental CSOs have been working over a longer period as well. In the agricul-
ture sector many of the standards regulate forestry and logging. Here there are cross–
cutting issues concerning both protection of the forest to maintain its ability to “catch” 
CO2, and the protection of human rights; perhaps particularly the protection of indigenous 
rights. Similar issues can be found within the mining sector. Arguably, there may be a con-
nection between the cross cutting issues, the broader alliances, and reputational concerns – 
triggering development of regulation. However, in an analysis of certification schemes on 
forests and forestry, Auld et al. (2008:191) note that the development within these stand-
ards was to a large extent triggered by producers that were unsatisfied with the institutional 
design of the Forest Stewardship Council’s (FSC) certification. The dissatisfaction was 
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directly linked to “the ability of environmental and social interests to outvote economic 
interests” (Auld et al. 2008:191). Consequently one may question whether the number of 
standards and certifications increase protection of human rights. 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Sectorial Standards 
Disaggregated at the sub-sectorial level, forestry and logging as well as manufacture of 
textiles are most frequent; however at the sub-sectorial level the standards are more evenly 
dispersed. When comparing the year the sectorial and sub-sectorial standards entered into 
force, it is difficult to identify specific waves. However in the mining and quarrying sector, 
one had a rapid development with the establishment of four standards in 2004 and 2005. 
The causes of this movement, the protections within the different sectors, and possible ex-
planations for the difference in progress as well as the different characteristics of the sec-
tors will be further discussed in the next chapter.  
3.3.5 Human Rights  
As described above, the standards hold a varying degree of human rights protections. But 
which human rights are most common to include, and what language do they use? Table 1 
on page 29 gives an overview of all the human rights that have been included in a standard. 
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From this table it becomes clear that non-discrimination is by far the most included of all 
human rights. Following non-discrimination, one finds the core ILO worker’s rights; child 
labor, slavery, and freedom of association. On the other end of the scale are the rights that 
have barely been included, either through a reference or substantially; social security, ade-
quate standard of living, arbitrary detention, freedom of religion, and disability rights. Re-
garding the scope of protection of human rights, a majority of the standards are limited to 
human rights reference. 
 
The rights that have been included the most are closely linked to worker’s rights. This is 
particularly visible through the relatively high inclusion of the right to fair wages and de-
cent living, and the right to join trade unions. Consequently, one could argue it is less sur-
prising that companies, as employers, to a higher extent accept standards that include these. 
From a theoretical point of view this represents a more narrow understanding of corporate 
human rights responsibility, more similar to Ignatieff than the SRSG. However, Alston 
(2004:507,518) predicts that the preference for worker’s human rights may be a result of 
the strategic policy choice of the ILO. In the late 1990’s ILO decided to narrow their focus 
to core principles culminating in the declaration on “Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work.” The core principles overlap with the most commonly referenced human rights: col-
lective bargaining, slavery, child labor, and discrimination.
12
 If the “Fundamental Princi-
ples and Rights at Work” has had this impact on the development of global standards, it 
will be interesting to see whether the UNGPs will have a similar effect as they have been 
argued to broaden the discussion and understanding of the scope of corporate responsibility 
(Taylor 2011:19f). A challenge the UNGPs face is that it may be easier to include the ILO 
core principles due to their minimalist nature. However, if the development of the standards 
is an expression of a legitimization with the ILO principles as the reference point, one 
could expect a substantive impact. 
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Table 1: Human Rights 
Labor Rights in bold, Group Rights in italics 
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Although standards primarily reference human rights, the language they use is quite strong. 
More than 50 percent of the time, the strongest words (must or shall) are used, closely fol-
lowed by should. What explains the strong use of words despite the primacy of reference to 
substantive is not clear. 
3.3.6 Human Rights Treaties 
When it comes to human rights treaties there is a strong correlation between when the 
standard entered into force and the inclusion of treaties in the framework.
 13
 This may be an 
expression of the move towards a higher inclusion of human rights. The increase in human 
rights treaties can indicate several things, two of which may be contradictory. First, it may 
indicate that the drafting parties see an added value of referring to treaties in order to 
strengthen the commitment. This would link to the argumentation of the positive impact of 
human rights treaties as tools for mobilization and increased protection. Second, it may 
indicate strategic inclusion of treaties consistent with an increased push for transparency. 
The inclusion of a treaty may serve as legitimation, consistent with the idea of strategic 
ratification and tactical concessions to avoid CSO pressure (Simmons 2009:113). As the 
analysis does not include an evaluation of actual compliance with the standards, little can 
be said on what the implications of the reference to treaties entail.  
 
Further, there is a positive correlation between when the standards entered into force, the 
inclusion of treaties in the standard’s text, and the number of treaties referenced.14 This 
could signal a development towards a higher inclusion of human rights treaties in interna-
tional standards, although one has yet to falsify this assumption. Out of the treaties, the 
UDHR is most sited (43), followed by the ICCPR (34), ILO (33), ICESCR (32), and the 
CRC (20).  
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 Significant at the 0.01 level. 
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3.3.7 Enforcement; Reporting, Complaints, and Certification 
The mechanisms for enforcement and monitoring of compliance with the standards vary. 
While a majority of the standards have limited mechanisms aimed at securing compliance, 
some standards have strong institutional measures through certification, reporting or com-
plaints mechanisms. As shown in Figure 4, approximately 40 percent of the standards have 
mechanisms for certification, while only 17 percent have complaints mechanisms.
15
 Com-
plaints mechanisms do not include internal corporate grievance mechanisms for stakehold-
ers, as there is limited information available on these. Further it would require a corporate 
level analysis which this paper does not aim to address.  
 
 
Figure 4: Enforcement 
 
The numbers for reporting are somewhat higher than the complaints and certification 
mechanisms.
16
 As shown in Figure 5, almost half of the standards require reporting from 
signatories. Reporting is counted when there is an expressed provision in the standard, re-
quiring periodic reporting on compliance and/or progress. Consequently, it does not reflect 
random or incident-specific reporting. On the strength of reporting, a majority of the mech-
anisms are not independent, but either self-reporting or a combination between self-
                                                 
 
15
 See Annex I. 
16
 See Auld et al. (2008) for trends in adoption and impact of certification mechanisms. 
Yes 
17 % 
No 
83 % 
Complaints 
Yes 
39 % 
No 
61 % 
Certification 
32 
 
reporting and multi-stakeholder input. Considering the economic argumentation on self-
regulation and effectiveness, this may weaken the effect of the reporting mechanism, unless 
there are sufficient mechanisms to verify the reports (Leisinger 2006). However, it can be 
an effective way of norm-diffusion as one makes the parties use a human rights and norm-
consistent language (Risse and Sikkink 1999:27). Considering costs, the standards which 
include certification mechanisms may imply a stronger protection of rights compared to 
standards which hold stronger legal protection but lack effective methods of measuring and 
ensuring compliance.  
 
 
Figure 5: Reporting 
 
There is a positive correlation between certification and scope, indicating that sectorial 
standards are more prone to certification.
 17
 Considering that universal standards are less 
specific this is as expected. It may be difficult to impose a certification mechanism on all 
businesses regardless of size or sector relying on general protection. Consequently, the 
economic argument for sectorial rather than universal standards to improve protection of 
rights is strengthened. However, as many sectors are not able to develop certification 
mechanisms, global protection can help close the gap. Certification will be further dis-
cussed in chapter four.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
The global system of standards is rapidly developing. Although one could argue that the 
increase in international standards indicates an improved protection of human rights, the 
facts are not conclusive. Arguable, one is witnessing an increase in the inclusion of human 
rights, but the distance between full inclusions of rights to the amount of standards supports 
the assumption of a protection gap. The fact that the most utilized human rights can be 
linked to the right of workers is another indication of the distance between protections in 
international law and the protections within the standards. Following Alston’s (2004) ar-
gumentation of the impact of the ILO’s decision to focus on core rights, a shift in discourse 
following the work of the SRSG may result in a more inclusive protection (Taylor 
2011:20). While the global system does protect human rights better today than it did in 
1977, one cannot claim that the protection gap does not exist. In the next two chapters, dif-
ferent approaches to closing the gap will be addressed.  
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 Alternatives to a Binding Treaty 4
As chapter three outlines, the global system of BHR is diverse. Different approaches are 
used, creating or adapting to the rapidly increasing field of BHR. Following the UNGPs, 
the creation of a legally binding instrument has increasingly become an issue of debate. 
The push for the development of an international treaty is linked to the assumption that law 
strengthens human rights protection (Simmons 2009:118f). However, when the aim is to 
increase protection, and assuming that corporate compliance with human rights will help 
increase this protection, it is of interest to assess if there are other alternatives that could be 
more effective, or other alternatives that secure greater compliance. In the environmental 
field for example, corporate-driven regulations have been more proactive than government, 
and initiatives have been strengthened in cooperation with CSOs to compensate for failure 
of governmental actions (Auld and Guldbrandsen 2013:399). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine which approach would be better to increase the pro-
tection of human rights. First, it elaborates on existing theories of corporate compliance and 
theories on treaty effectiveness; assessing arguments for a legally binding document, re-
sponsive regulation and corporate driven standards, and sectorial regulation. Then, drawing 
on findings in chapter three, it elaborates on the characteristics of sectorial standards and 
assesses trends in corporate adoption and human rights. 
4.1 Regulatory Alternatives 
4.1.1 Legal 
To increase the protection of right holders globally, efforts have been made to create an 
international framework to strengthen regulation on states as well as creating obligations on 
corporations; most recently with the draft resolution on a BHR treaty (HRC 2014b). As 
mentioned, the rationale for pushing for stronger regulation builds on the idea that law will 
strengthen compliance and increase protection (Simmons 2009:118f). From a legal per-
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spective, an extension from voluntary regulations to include States strengthens provisions, 
as they are the primary duty-bearers under IHRL. Given that states already have a domestic 
obligation, the focus for proponents of legally binding regulation has been clarification of 
extraterritorial obligations of states, as well as legal obligations for corporations (Deva and 
Bilschitz 2013:4).  
 
Considering the presumption that legal provisions will enable compliant behavior, estab-
lishing a framework which sets out the obligations will be important (Deva and Bilschitz 
2013). Legally binding provisions can influence the institutional protections of human 
rights which may be important in constraining corporate behavior (Campbell 2007:947). In 
the context of the push for a global treaty, clarification of legal responsibility may strength-
en the regulatory power of states. Ecuador for example, has been struggling to hold MNCs 
responsible and secure remedies to victims of human rights abuses (BHRRC 2012). In this 
context, a binding regulation could give states and victims more leeway in securing effec-
tive protection, which may be why Ecuador is pushing for a global treaty.  
 
A legal approach could further ensure consistency in expectations and eliminate the threat 
of a prisoner’s dilemma (Deva 2012:10). One may become subject to a prisoner’s dilemma 
when one has to choose whether or not to comply with a standard based on a cost–benefit 
analysis of presumed advantage in the two scenarios. E.g. it may be more economically 
beneficial to not comply with a standard if it allows you to offer a competitive price at the 
expense of human rights protection, if the cost of non-compliance is low (Deva 2012:10). If 
the provision is legally binding however, one would assume that the cost is higher. From a 
human rights perspective, legal protections could further secure diffusion of norms on the 
scope of corporate responsibility (Risse and Sikkink 1999:27f). With regards to corporate 
standards, norm diffusion could influence the corporate rationale for compliance, moving 
from strategic adaption to changing culture. Additionally, work on the effect of human 
rights treaties points to the positive impact of treaty ratification in transitional states (Sim-
mons 2009:152). While a business and human rights treaty is targeting host and home 
states, rather than state obligations for its population, the argued success of treaties in en-
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hancing human rights protection should be noted in the discussion as the impact of a global 
treaty on business could be similar. 
 
There are some challenges to a global treaty. One of the primary concerns is that a global 
treaty will not be able to address specific or sectorial issues which will ultimately lead to a 
weaker protection of human rights (Posner 2014:93). Generalized obligations have to be 
formulated in a way which allows for adoption across and within different sectors and 
states. This may weaken the language and in conjunction the protection of the right. Addi-
tionally, although parties to treaties are bound to uphold them, enforcement is a challenge 
for human rights treaties. Further, there is no consensus on the scope of or ability for corpo-
rate responsibility under international law. Consequently, the treaty would be laying the 
groundwork for the direction of international law in this regards. As experienced with the 
UN Norms, there are practical challenges to developing binding obligations. However, one 
should note that sectorial treaties have developed, one of which will be assessed in the 
chapter five – the FWCTC. 
4.1.2 Responsive Regulation 
As chapter three describes, a large number of standards are driven and adopted by corpora-
tions as a means of self-regulation. Where proponents of a treaty can be argued to represent 
an exogenous approach to corporate regulation, self-regulation represents an endogenous 
approach. Rather than imposing regulations from above onto companies, corporate stand-
ards represent steps to regulate from within (Moravscik 2012:100; Laufer 2003). Steps to 
ensure self-regulation are connected to a responsive approach, responding to complaints of 
violations (Braithwaite 2011:481). Similarly, the incrementalist approach of the SRSG ar-
gues that corporate compliance and consequently human rights protection will increase 
over time through a bottom-up approach (De Schutter 2013:xix). 
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Theoretically, one assumes that parties are more likely to accept and comply with regula-
tion they have participated in drafting (Campbell 2007:955). Considering the data in chap-
ter three, the high presence of labor rights may be an indication of this.
18
 Reflecting on ar-
gumentation of self-regulation and corporate willingness to comply, effective protection 
may be stronger in corporate standards despite the lack of legal strength. Further, argu-
ments on corporate regulations have a reflexive character, where non-compliance will lead 
to a consequence which may or may not impact profit, which therefore may or may not 
impact protection (Braithwaite 2011:482f). Consequently, corporate standards would be an 
effective way to enhance protection of human rights as they allow for a flexible adaption to 
the different challenges (Taylor 2011).  
 
Proponents of corporate standards often rely on argumentation connected to the “business 
case” for human rights. The premise of the business case is that corporations will benefit 
from human rights compliance, linking the two as mutually reinforcing (Deva 2012:139). 
Further, building on the assumptions of rational choice theory, corporations will be more 
compelled to comply if this is included in the cost-benefit analysis (Elster 1986). With an 
aim to increase corporate participation and compliance, this may be a strength of corporate-
driven standards.  
 
Although standards drafted and adopted by corporations are not of a legal character, they 
can hold a possibility for strong enforcement mechanisms like certification. Certification 
mechanisms allow for comparability and opens up for consumer pressure (Auld et al. 
2008). Through certification one can ensure a degree of protection, and increase the benefit 
of compliance. In certain contexts, only certified products may be granted access. While 
the total exclusion of non-certified products would be linked to state regulations or state 
efforts, the threat of market exclusion would be a strong economic incentive for corporate 
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actors (Auld et al. 2008:195). Further, it is an accessible way for CSOs and media to identi-
fy and address discrepancies.  
 
Considering corporate standards from a human rights perspective, introduces some chal-
lenges. As the business case builds on the rationale of complying to secure a competitive 
advantage, rather than acknowledging a responsibility, one faces the risk of corporate cap-
ture (Deva 2012).
19 
This can also be a challenge if one considers the theory of norm entre-
preneurs who may gain an advantage of early adoption (Gillies 2010). Further, compliance 
with regulation without belief in the necessity and rights of the protection may weaken the 
content of the right, leaving you with strong language but weak protections (Jochnick 1999; 
World Bank 2003).  
 
In relation to strategic compliance a challenge is the increased likelihood of a prisoner’s 
dilemma (Deva 2012:10). Given the diversity and difference in protections, corporations 
may calculate strategic non-compliance. Considering the regulatory challenge today with 
the difference in standards and regulations, the rationale behind enhancing compliance 
through corporate standards is weak from a human rights perspective; as such compliance 
with corporate standards may have limited value.  
4.1.3 Sectorial 
Sectorial standards are in the intersection between the general characteristics of a global 
treaty and the specificity of corporate standards; combining the elements of the strength of 
hard law and the focus of corporate regulations. Sector specific standards is a general term 
and includes both corporate/industry driven, and states or multi-stakeholder initiatives. In 
this discussion, sectorial standards will primarily be referred to as state or multi-stakeholder 
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initiatives, as the challenges and benefits of corporate driven sectorial standards are similar 
to those addressed in the previous subchapter.  
 
Sectorial standards have the ability to tailor provisions to context. Building on Campbell’s 
(2007:947) argumentation of institutional constrains, one can design a framework enabling 
compliance. Having identified specific challenges, one can tailor responses to address these 
challenges through stronger language. Consequently, in the debate on the global treaty, an 
alternative could be to create sectorial treaties, tailored to the specific challenges faced 
within the different industries. As chapter three reveals, sectorial development has been 
particularly strong within three sectors; forestry, manufacture of textiles, and mining.
20
 
Considering the different characters of these sectors one may find different reasons for the 
development. From a rational choice or institutionalist point of view, one would expect that 
the development of standards is linked to reputational concerns or degree of exposure 
(Campbell 2007). Reflexive regulation on behalf of the state could respond to the exposed 
violation to secure compliance, and corporations would act to uphold competitive ad-
vantage (Deva 2012).  
 
The flexibility of sectorial adapting could consequently indicate that sectorial standards are 
a good alternative to the global treaty. However, some challenges remain; what about the 
sectors that are not exposed? What happens when corporations operate in more than one 
sector? How do states treat corporations from the different sectors? The inequality in regu-
lations and their development raise a series of questions on how the different actors can 
behave. If the development of regulations is made within sectors rather than globally or 
nationally, this may limit the diffusion of norms which has been highlighted as central in 
the effect of international treaties.  
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Beyond the unequal development, and despite the promise of sectorial standards, a chal-
lenge from a human rights perspective is that regardless of state, sector or corporate charac-
teristics, human rights must be protected. Although one has a specific challenge with e.g. 
conflict minerals, the protection of rights for those affected by the enterprises should be as 
good here as in any other field. Or if we turn it around, the presence of specific challenges 
which have in fact triggered sectorial development of standards does not indicate that simi-
lar protections are necessary in other industries. Further, as with the corporate driven stand-
ards, there may be a tendency to include only those human rights which are perceived 
threatened by corporate behavior. This may be countered with a general approach to secto-
rial standards, building on the operationalization of the PRR framework, and the holistic 
approach of the SRSG (HRC 2011). 
4.2 Method and Hypotheses 
The overarching question of this chapter is whether alternatives to a global treaty may give 
greater protection for right-holders than a global treaty. In order to address how the system 
works considering theories of compliance, this chapter takes a quantitative approach to 
compare and identify characteristics. Similar to chapter three, the method reflects the aim 
of the paper to assess the state of the global system. Through testing different hypotheses, 
the analysis assesses whether human rights language and human rights inclusion are factors 
of sectorial or global standards. Independent variables which may influence the explanatory 
power of the model are included to strengthen the analysis.  
 
In addition to testing for explanatory power of the model this chapter examines different 
hypotheses on the level of corporations and sectors. Due to the characteristics of the data 
the analysis is not aimed at proving the alternative hypothesis, but rather disproving the 
null hypothesis (Field 2009). Generally, the null hypothesis is that “there is no effect in the 
population” (Field 2009:53). Consequently, if there are significant results above .05, the 
null hypothesis is considered disproved as it is highly unlikely that it will occur. If the data 
are not significant, the null hypothesis is not proved, but there is a higher chance that the 
hypothesis will not occur (Field 2009:54).  
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4.2.1 UN Driven v Corporate Driven 
A reoccurring argument is that a UN driven global treaty will hold broader human rights 
protections than the current system. Building on this presumption, the first alternative hy-
pothesis is that corporate driven standards will give greater human rights protection than a 
UN driven global treaty. The corresponding null hypothesis is that corporate driven stand-
ards will not give greater protection. In order to assess this hypothesis, tests are run on 
adoption and the strength of human rights protections. Testing adoption for correlations 
between the drafting and adopting parties will assess whether one is more likely to achieve 
corporate adoption of standards if they are the drivers.  
 
With regards to the strength of standards, Fransen (2012:172) argues that corporate driven 
standards hold weaker protections than multi-stakeholder ones. Comparing standards on 
forestry, clothing, IT-Electronics, and chemicals, Fransen and Conzelmann (2014:16) find 
that the corporate driven standards in IT-Electronics and chemicals are more lenient than 
the two other sectors where the drafting had been multi-stakeholder. Although the results 
were inconclusive on all but sectorial fragmentation, they allow for a hypothesis on the 
connection between corporate drafting and strength of regulation. These assumptions corre-
spond with the argumentation of Leisinger (2006) and Posner (2014) on the weakness of 
self-regulation. To assess this relationship, a test will be conducted on the strength of hu-
man rights language, inclusion of human rights, and binding character of the standard. 
4.2.2 Global v. Sectorial 
A second alternative hypothesis reflects on the difference between sectorial and universal 
standards. Similar to the corporate driven standards, a test will be conducted on the strength 
of the human rights provisions. As an argument for the sectorial standards is linked to the 
ability to tailor protection, the analysis will reflect on the strength of the human rights lan-
guage, scope of inclusion, and the strength of the standard as binding or voluntary. Further, 
sectorial standards facilitate certification mechanisms as a tool for increasing compliance. 
As certification mechanisms have been linked to compliance from both an economic and 
political viewpoint, with an increase in costs, the existence of these will be assessed to-
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wards development of new standards in the same field (Auld et al. 2008:194). The benefit 
of this analysis is that it assesses how certification relates to development of standards. If 
there is a positive relationship and the standards which hold certification appear strong, this 
could influence the disproving of the null hypothesis.  
 
Chapter three discussed the development of standards within specific sectors. Looking at 
the sectorial development from the theory of norm cascading (Gillies 2010; Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998) one could expect that the development of one standard within a sector has 
facilitated the development of other standards within the same sector. Consequently, one 
could expect to see a development of standards, perhaps with increased protection of hu-
man rights. A time-based analysis of the development of human rights protections and the 
inclusion of treaties or rights within a sector could allow for acceptance of falsification of a 
null hypothesis of no relationship between the increase in protection and increase in stand-
ards. Beyond testing whether one could be witnessing a norm cascade, this approach will 
address the incrementalist approach of the SRSG, who argues that time will gradually in-
crease the protection of rights (HRC 2011:4).  
4.2.3 Exposure 
Related to issues of corporate or sectorial development is the rational approach of compli-
ance as a factor of exposure. As discussed above, exposure to consumers as well as CSOs 
could influence the level of compliance and development of standards (Campbell 2007). 
Consequently, an alternative hypothesis tests the relationship between development of 
standards based on degree of exposure, as well as the strength of the human rights provi-
sions included. The null hypothesis is that there is no connection between the degree of 
exposure, sector, or strength of standards.  
4.3 Findings 
4.3.1 UN Driven v. Corporate Driven 
As visible in Table 2 there is a significant correlation between corporate drafting and cor-
porate adoption of standards. This strengthens the assumption that corporations are likely to 
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adopt standards they have drafted themselves. A linear regression analysis further identifies 
this relationship. Significant at the 0.05 level, corporate drafting does increase the likeli-
hood of corporate adoption. However, corporate drafting only explains 11.7 % of the vari-
ance indicating that other factors greatly influence corporate adopting.
21
  
 
 
Table 2: Correlation Corporate Adopting - Corporate Drafting 
 
Testing for strength of the different standards, there is no correlation between corporate or 
multi-stakeholder initiatives and the strength of human rights provisions. This indicates that 
the assumption of weaker provisions in global instruments may be false. Further, there is 
no significant relationship between the strength of the human rights provision and the bind-
ing character of the standard. While this could be connected to the fact that a majority of 
the international standards are voluntary in scope, it is an indication that strong human 
rights language is not necessarily consistent with strong human rights protections. Consid-
ering the tests on the relationship between corporate drafting, corporate adoption, strength 
and scope of human rights provisions, one cannot disprove the null hypothesis.  
4.3.2 Global v. Sectorial 
Visible in Figure 6 on page 45, sectorial standards do in fact hold stronger human rights 
language than universal standards. However, when checked for the inclusion of human 
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rights within the standards, those that are global have a higher degree of full and partial 
inclusion comparatively to none or only specific. To assess the explanatory factor of sector 
on the strength and inclusion of human rights, a linear regression analysis was done; how-
ever, there were no significant findings to report. This is in itself a finding, as it indicates 
that it is less likely that sectorial standards will hold stronger human rights protection than 
universal standards. In other words, the results do not disprove the null hypothesis. 
 
With regards to certification, there is a significant correlation between the strength of the 
human rights language and existence of certification mechanisms. Although the number of 
standards which hold certification mechanisms is quite low, lowering the sample size, the 
correlation is nonetheless interesting. Testing the relationship in a linear regression reveals 
that certification explains 10.4 percent of the variance in human rights language.
22
 The ex-
istence of a certification mechanism increases the probability that the human rights lan-
guage will be stronger. Considering theoretical assumptions on the impact of certification 
mechanisms as method of enforcement the assumptions these findings have some implica-
tions on the understanding of human rights protection. However one should note that there 
is a difference in the impact of certification (Auld et al. 2008).  
 
On the relationship between certification and development of standards, a simple crosstab 
analysis reveals that all but one of the certification mechanisms can be found within the 
three sectors holding the majority of the standards. Drawing on the finding on the relation-
ship between certification and strength of human rights language, one could argue that the 
sectorial standards that have been developed within the dominating sectors are strong, but 
the data is not conclusive enough to disprove the null hypothesis. 
                                                 
 
22
 See Annex II; this is only significant at the 0.09 level.  
45 
 
 
Figure 6: Strength of Human Rights 
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Further, as the alternative hypothesis questions, there is no link between certification 
mechanisms and the development of new standards within a sector; i.e. the existence of a 
certification mechanism does not stop the development of new standards in the same field. 
Rather, it appears to trigger the development of new mechanisms. This can limit the 
strength of certification (Auld et al. 2008).  
 
As Graph 2 indicates there have been periods with more rapid expansion of standards. 
While development in mining and agriculture has been quite similar, manufacturing stand-
ards developed early. Checking for human rights language and inclusion of human rights, 
the development is virtually equally distributed.  
 
 
Graph 2: Increase in Sectorial Standards (cumulative) 
 
Based on the findings it is difficult to assess whether the null hypothesis is disproved or 
not. Assessing the strength of the human rights provisions, one could argue that the data is 
not sufficient to disprove the null hypothesis given the degree of human rights inclusion. 
However, on certification, the data supports the alternative hypothesis as it solidifies 
strength to the sectorial standards. With regards to the norm cascade, the developments in 
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the fields of agriculture, mining, and manufacturing, indicate intra-sectorial cascades, 
weakening the alternative hypothesis. It is likely that one could find support for the alterna-
tive hypothesis; however, given the inconsistency of significant relationships, it is difficult 
to disprove the null hypothesis.  
4.3.3 Exposure 
A crosstab of sectors and exposure reveals that almost all the sectors which have seen a 
development of standards (with the exception of half of the standards on mining and quar-
rying) are exposed to CSO or consumer pressure. As there is no registered information on 
the sectors which have yet to develop standards, one cannot infer causality. However, it is 
an indication of a connection between exposure and sectorial development. Further, there is 
significant
23
 correlation between strong human rights language and sectorial exposure. As 
shown in Table 3, it explains 15.6 % of the variance in human rights language, supporting 
the assumption of a positive link.  
 
 
Table 3: Exposure - Human Rights Language 
Consequently, one could argue that the null hypothesis of no connection is disproved, as it 
is likely that one will develop standards if operating within an exposed sector. An interest-
ing implication would be to assess what this means for non-exposed sectors; that they will 
not develop or that other factors matter more. Further, one should remember that the sec-
tors that have yet to develop standards may be exposed to consumer pressure. Before con-
cluding on causality further tests would have to be run.  
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4.4 Implications 
The analysis of the data reveals that corporations are prone to adopt self-regulation or regu-
lation from other corporations. Further, there is not significant support for an assumption 
that multi-stakeholder initiatives give greater protection of human rights than corporate 
driven standards. However, the lack of correlation between multi-stakeholder initiatives 
and strength of human rights protections does not in itself say that corporate driven stand-
ards hold better protections. While certification mechanisms support the strength of both 
corporate and sectorial standards, their varying effect challenges the assumption (Auld et 
al. 2008:201ff). The data are not conclusive in establishing the relationship which makes it 
difficult to say something specific about the connection. Corporate adopting is not the same 
as corporate compliance. Consequently, one cannot establish whether corporate standards 
are a sufficient alternative to a UN driven treaty in protection, but one can establish that 
corporate adoption is greater if corporations are the drafters. In the debate on the treaty 
process, corporate participation may arguably be important to secure corporate buy-in.  
 
Reflecting on the enforcement of standards, the connection between certification and hu-
man rights language could indicate that strong human rights language can lead to effective 
protection if there are certification mechanisms. Considering the connection between certi-
fication and the three dominating sectors the assumption of a link between certification and 
halt in development of standards is considered disproved. In light of the assumption on the 
strength of certification in shaping behavior, through amongst other thing determining ac-
cess to markets, this is an interesting observation. If it is consistent at the global level, one 
could perhaps question whether new mechanisms are created to avoid compliance with 
those in existence and if a variety of standards with certification limits the cost of non-
compliance. However, these are just speculations, and more research is necessary to ad-
dress them. Overall, certification mechanism should be considered a strength of the sectori-
al standards.  
 
Considering enforcement, sectorial standards appear to be a possible alternative to univer-
sal standards given the strength of certification mechanisms and the strength of the lan-
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guage in human rights provisions. However, from a human rights perspective, the lack of 
development in a majority of economic sectors, which may or may not be exposed to CSOs 
or consumer pressure, raises some concerns. Given the finding that strong human rights 
language is not correlated with high inclusion of human rights, understood as reference to 
human rights treaties and substantive human rights provisions,
24
 one diminishes the value 
of a strong language. As such, the use of strong language cannot be seen as a strong human 
rights protection in itself. Further, the degree of inclusion of human rights protections is 
higher in the universal standards. Whether the effective protection of the included human 
rights is stronger in the sectorial standards is not clear. Consequently, one could argue that 
a universal treaty would give broader human rights protection than sectorial standards.  
 
Balancing the different observations, universal standards appear to hold the greatest human 
rights protection through the breadth in their inclusion; given compliance with the provi-
sions as well as clarification in the division of corporate and state obligations. Where the 
sectorial standards are limited, is the degree of self-regulation. In the fields of agriculture, 
mining and quarrying, and manufacture, standards with certification mechanisms have de-
veloped. However, in the remainder of the sectors only a limited number or no protections 
at all have evolved. This could be due to limited exposure or the absence of early movers as 
norm entrepreneurs. Consequently, from a human rights perspective universal standards 
hold more promise. The inclusion of states and the link to international law gives additional 
strength to the argument. However, focusing on a global universal standard should not dis-
courage sectorial development as they may be complementary. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Assessing the alternatives to a universal global treaty reveals that there are some challenges 
to the universal treaty which other alternatives may be better at addressing. With regards to 
the strength of the human rights protections and the possibility of enforcement, it appears 
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that sectorial standards through the use of certification mechanisms may be an important 
contribution. Additionally, the willingness of corporations to adopt standards which were 
drafted by them or other corporations, is an important observation when considering how to 
secure corporate buy-in. Getting corporations to adopt a universal treaty is an issue which 
is often raised in the debate on the way ahead, and was frequently discussed at the third 
annual UN Forum on Business and Human Rights in Geneva.
25
 However, the strength of 
the alternatives do not seem to balance out the importance of securing a global framework, 
both to establish universal standards on minimum protection, but also to address inconsist-
encies in the different spheres of international law. As changes to the regime of internation-
al law will require state participation and a unified approach, it is difficult to envision a 
holistic increase in protection of rights without the treaty. This leads to a preliminary con-
clusion of a combination of a global treaty and sectorial enforcement. The possible legisla-
tive impact of a universal treaty will be assessed in the following chapter. 
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 Do International Standards Have an Impact? 5
Identifying the system of international standards and alternative methods of regulation al-
lows for a description of which protections already exist. However, it gives less insight into 
whether or not these protections work as intended. In considering the debate on a binding 
treaty on BHR, one should reflect on how current regulatory systems have influenced state 
and corporate behavior. Consequently, as a final examination on how to protect human 
rights in the light of state and corporate violations, this chapter analyzes legislative effects 
of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FWCTC).  
5.1 Background - What is the FWCTC? 
The FWCTC is an international treaty on regulation of tobacco control. It marks the first 
use of the World Health Assembly’s regulating powers established in the WHO constitu-
tion of 1948 (WHO 2009).
26
 As an international health organization WHO draws its man-
date from the UN Charter and the human right to health, established both in UDHR and 
ICESCR
27
. The strong link between the right to health and control over tobacco regulation 
is solidified in the Open Working Group’s proposal to the post-2015 Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs). In the SDGs continued implementation of the FWCTC is included as a 
target under goal 3a to “ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages” 
(OWG 2014:13).  
 
The FWCTC entered into force Feb. 27 2005, and with 180 parties since its adoption it has 
reached nearly universal ratification. Concerns about the health risk of the use of tobacco 
peaked in the early 90’s as reports showed that tobacco was the number one cause of prem-
ature deaths (WHO 2015). As a response to the rapidly increasing global health challenges 
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connected to the use of tobacco, the World Health Assembly initiated work on the FWCTC 
in 1996 (WHO 2015). Following the establishment of a technical working group in 1999, 
negotiations on the convention started in 2000, and the World Health Assembly adopted 
the final version in 2003. The aim of the convention is to lower the demand and usage of 
tobacco products. Core provisions include the use of price and non-price measures to “re-
duce the demand for tobacco.”28 This includes regulation on content, labeling, communica-
tion, and advertising. It consequently gives states room and responsibility to act to limit the 
efforts of companies.  
 
Although the convention is only binding on states, it arguably affects the companies’ en-
joyment of rights as it sets global boundaries for how they can do business. Provisions reg-
ulating how one can market products, and which limits the states can set on branding, 
packaging, and advertisement, are arguably directly binding not only on states but also on 
corporations (given that the protections are implemented in the states). An illustration of 
the convention’s relevance to business is the current corporate legal challenge to Australia 
and Uruguay’s implementation of regulation concerning plain packaging. This is firmly 
supported by the FWCTC. However, following the enactment of regulation, Philip Morris 
issued a request for arbitration claiming indirect expropriation of their investment in the 
states.
29
 Beyond reflecting the tension between the different regulatory systems of invest-
ment and human rights law, it points to the effect the FWCTC can have, or has, on corpo-
rate behavior.  
5.1.1 Changes in Policy and Regulation 
Changes in regulation have not only occurred in Australia and Uruguay. A study from 2013 
shows that following the entry into force of the FWCTC, the amount of cigarette packages 
with health warning labels jumped from 8.42 to 22.33 percent from 2003-2013 compara-
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 See Philip Morris v. Uruguay and Philip Morris v. Australia. 
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tively to 1984-2003 (Sanders-Jackson et al. 2013). This indicates that there may have been 
an effect of the FWCTC on the development of regulation. Whether these developments 
stem from the treaty itself or from the treaty process may be less clear, as there may be dif-
ferent explanations to why regulation developed; the adoption or ratification of the 
FWCTC, the negotiation process of the treaty, and external factors. 
 
With regards to the effect of ratification, a rationale with a treaty is that states will alter 
their behavior to comply with the provisions in it (Posner 2014:60). Following the VCLT 
art 26, states must perform the treaty in good faith. Consequently, one could expect that the 
ratification may have an impact on policy. Arguing that the negotiation process for the 
FWCTC was influential in policy adoption, Wipfli and Huang (2011:113) find that there 
was a rapid diffusion of norms following the initiation of the treaty process by the WHO. 
Using data on adaption and adoption of policies regulating tobacco, they find that a majori-
ty of states had adopted at least one new policy on tobacco regulation in the period from 
1995-2005. Although focusing their research on three thematic groups of policies - adver-
tisement, warning labels, and public smoke restrictions, their findings indicate that the trea-
ty negotiations process triggered an increase in policy adoption. Despite not being debated 
by Wipfli and Huang, this could arguably also be linked to a rational state strategy of 
adapting behavior prior to ratifications in order to reduce the cost of post-adoption compli-
ance (Posner 2014:60). Beyond the treaty process, external factors may play a role in poli-
cy change. Wipfli and Huang (2011) identify some that had a significant impact on policy 
adoption in the negotiations phase of the FWCTC; GNI, population size, democracy, geo-
graphical region, tobacco production within country, gender smoking prevalence, and 
GLOBALink
30
 participation.  
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5.1.2 Observed Progress 
As the FWCTC recently celebrated its ten-year anniversary, different analyses of the effect 
of the treaty have been conducted. In their research on the effectiveness of tax and price 
policies Chaloupka, Straif, and Leon (2010) find a positive relationship between increase in 
price and decrease in demand of tobacco. Similarly, Yach (2014) argues that the WHO 
framework has contributed strongly to the decrease in demand for tobacco. He specifically 
points to what the WHO has recognized as the most efficient evidence-based tools for re-
ducing the demand - MPOWER (WHO 2013:11f). These measures include; Monitoring 
tobacco use and tobacco control policies; Protecting people from the dangers of tobacco 
smoke; Offering help to quit tobacco; Warning the public about the dangers of tobacco; 
Enforcing bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; and Raising tobacco 
taxes (WHO 2008). The yearly reports from the WHO reveal that an increasing amount of 
parties are adapting to the framework (WHO 2013). 
 
However, despite the reduction in demand, and the increase in ratifications, there seems to 
be a discrepancy between the developed and the developing countries. While smoking rates 
are going down in the developed world, the use of tobacco products is increasing in devel-
oping countries, particularly in China (Tobacco Atlas 2015). Further, in a clip from 2008, a 
tobacco executive stated that this was “probably the most profitable” 31 time ever. Numbers 
from the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids (2014) similarly reveal that the value of ciga-
rette production is surpassing the retail value. On a global scale, large production compa-
nies, like Philip Morris, are outgrowing the local brands of tobacco (Campaign for Tobac-
co-Free Kids 2014). An example of the persistent use of tobacco is found in Indonesia, 
where school kids use tobacco on a daily basis; perhaps most famously the child that was 
addicted to tobacco from the age of two.
32
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 Last week with John Oliver (2015) at 2:19. 
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 Last week with John Oliver (2015) at 3:00. 
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Reflecting on how an international treaty may influence the development of rights within a 
community has been a reoccurring issue in the human rights field. Risse and Sikkink 
(1999:17ff) have developed a spiral model, aiming at explaining the diffusion of interna-
tional norms into domestic legislation and opinion. As a foundational theory within human 
rights, it assumes that in order for norm diffusion to be effective there has to be both inter-
national and national push from civil society. Simmons (2009:153) argues that the impact 
of an international treaty will be greater in transitional democracies, where the political 
leeway may be largest. Consequently, one should expect a greater change in behavior in 
countries in a developing phase rather than within those with more stable political regimes. 
Linking this assumption to the question of implementation of the provisions within the 
FWCTC, one would assume a greater change in lower or middle-income countries. From 
an economic perspective, the cost of ratification will be lower for the states that already 
have provisional protection in order at the time of ratification. This might explain some of 
the variance in the effect of the treaty - as there is less adaption to be done.  
5.2 Theories of Impact 
Addressing the creation and impact of international norms, Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1998:895ff) identify a three stage process from norm emergence through a norm cascade 
to internalization. Norm emergence is initiated by norm entrepreneurs or early actors driv-
en by persuasion of the necessity of a given norm. A norm cascade is described as a pro-
cess of “broad …acceptance” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:895) of the norm following 
pressure from the early adopters. Understanding the emergence of international norms 
through this model, one would argue that there are some norm entrepreneurs which gener-
ate a norm cascade based on the cost of non-compliance. As a result of broad acceptance of 
the norm, it becomes internalized in domestic or corporate policies. Gillies (2010) applies 
the framework to the emergence of transparency norms within the oil sector, where the 
early actions of British Petroleum (BP) in increasing transparency in their operations in 
Angola led to a cascade of increased transparency and regulation within the sector. Conse-
quently, it became more challenging to maintain a lower level of transparency. Using 
Wipfli and Huang’s (2011) findings, one could debate whether the WHO is a norm entre-
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preneur or if the FWCTC is part of a norm cascade. Following their argumentation, it ap-
pears that the process of negotiation was a driver of regulatory change, indicating that the 
movement within the WHO to push for change was a tipping point triggering the following 
norm cascade.  
 
The challenge of withstanding a norm cascade can be linked to elements of rational choice 
theory. As foreshadowed, Gillies argues that the reputational concerns of oil sector corpo-
rations increased the cost of not adopting codes of conduct which focus on transparency; 
“transparency served the reputational agendas of several prominent international actors” 
(Gillies 2010:104). Consequently, it was economically rational for the corporations to 
adopt a policy on transparency despite the possible costs of adaption. As competitors adapt 
to regulation the weighted benefit of non-compliance is balanced against a competitive 
advantage. Balancing of costs and benefits is the core of rational choice theory. Scholars 
who write within this field draw on the assumption that all actors, in this case corporations 
and states, will do a cost-benefit analysis (based on perfect information) before changing 
behavior. In his discussion on the institutional frameworks of corporate regulations Camp-
bell (2007:947) draws on these assumptions and argues that given rational choice theories, 
one should assume that corporations will always act in socially irresponsible ways to secure 
the highest attainable profit. However, this is not always the case. Some corporations are 
frontrunners in the development of international regulation. Trying to understand this be-
havior, Gillies (2010) identifies the competitive advantage of early movement; attracting 
goodwill and participation in the framing process. A corporation or state’s ability to move 
first on these issues can be limited by the economic or institutional structures they operate 
within.  
 
Drawing on institutionalism, Campbell (2007:954) argues that the institutional structures 
can enable socially responsible behavior. Using historical empirical examples from the 
meat packing industry and work place security, he links change in corporate behavior to 
regulatory measures from the state. Institutional constraints or institutional leeway can be 
reflected in Simmons’ (2009:126f) argument on the impact of rights framing. Through a 
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study on the effect of treaty ratification and a focus on mobilization, Simmons argues that 
the existence of a treaty enables CSOs within a state, alone or in cooperation with interna-
tional CSOs, to claim an increased protection of human rights. This can be linked to the 
institutional protections an international treaty system creates. Advantages of the existence 
of international institutions can thus be an argument for the necessity of binding regula-
tions, as with the FWCTC.  
 
The idea of institutional constraints is not necessarily in conflict with the structures identi-
fied by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:894). Arguably, state regulation could be an expres-
sion of a norm cascade pushed through government by norm entrepreneurs. The legally 
binding character of regulations increases the cost of non-compliance – given enforcement, 
and the internalization of the norm into the business. Within the discussion on institutional 
constraints is the question of sectorial exposure. Deva (2012:193) envisions a framework 
where social naming and shaming is a central sanction in an integrated approach of regula-
tion. In order for strategies of naming and shaming to be effective, they have to have an 
impact on the income or economy of the corporation. Naming and shaming is to a large 
extent targeted at altering consumer behavior. Consequently, the corporations have to be 
exposed to consumers. As witnessed with the global campaign on palm oil, where consum-
ers strategically avoided products which included palm oil due to the expressed reason of 
the use of palm oil, the cost of non-adaptation triggered alterations. While naming and 
shaming may have an impact where consumer behavior has the power through consump-
tion, it is less effective where corporations are less or not exposed to consumers. Conse-
quently, it can be limited in triggering all-round behavioral change.  
5.3 Method 
The FWCTC was selected for analysis for several reasons. First, it is an internationally 
binding document which enables state regulation on corporations as well as creating obli-
gations on corporations. Second, as it is celebrating its tenth anniversary this spring, a suf-
ficient amount of time has passed to yield a valuable analysis. Third, as it is monitored by 
the WHO, there is readily available information on country development on relevant issues.  
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5.3.1 Assumption and Hypothesis 
The research question for this analysis is whether international standards have an effect, 
specifically, whether the FWCTC has had a legislative effect on domestic legislation. Do-
mestic legislation (DomesticLeg) serves as the dependent variables in the analysis. Having 
domestic legislation as a dependent variable enables understanding of development of 
adaption. Similar to the work of Helfer and Voeten (2014) on movement on LGBT issues 
in Europe in relation to landmark rulings at the ECtHR, the analysis looks at whether ratifi-
cation of the FWCTC has had an observable effect on adoption of domestic legislation and 
regulation. Both updated regulation and adoption of laws are included in the analysis as 
regulation signals adaptation through policy changes in addition to law. Further, including 
regulations expands the understanding of development, as it captures broader state 
measures on tobacco control issues. However, as states regulate differently, there may be 
some instances where one law in one country might hold the same protections as three reg-
ulations in another. This could inflate the numbers, but as Tobacco Control Laws (2015), 
which is the source of the data, only assesses regulation in the fields of smoke free places, 
tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship, and tobacco packaging and labelling, ra-
ther than general legislation on tobacco, the differences are limited. Additionally, these are 
the same legislative and policy fields that were surveyed by Wipfli and Huang (2011:108). 
Although there are some similarities, the data in this analysis have not been weighted as 
strong or weak due to limitations in time. Further research could include this aspect to at-
tain more disaggregated data and in-depth understanding.  
 
In order to address the question of what explains the difference in compliance with the 
FWCTC, and following the work of Wipfli and Huang (2011), data has been collected on 
the year of ratification of the convention, mean years of education, GNI per capita, and 
entry into force of domestic legislation on tobacco control. Further, the data can be dis-
aggregated by geographic region. Analyzing whether the variables correlate with domestic 
legislation as the dependent variable allows for identification of possible connections be-
tween action and impact. If treaty ratification and state of existing legislation are strongly 
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linked, this should be included in the discussion on the future of the binding treaty on BHR 
- as a global treaty that authenticates state regulation of corporate behavior. 
 
With domestic legislation as the dependent variable, tests are run on whether there are re-
gional, financially, or development triggered differences. Given the observations on the 
rate of smoking in developing v developed countries, one would expect a difference in be-
havior when adapting to the FWCTC. Further, drawing on the assumption of cost of adopt-
ing, an initial test is conducted on the existence of a connection between adoption in the 
early 1990s, adoption in the negotiations phase (1999-2003), and adoption following the 
conventions entry into force. Ultimately the analysis answers two alternative hypotheses: 
 
H1: The FWCTC has generated adoption of new regulation/legislation 
H0: The FWCTC has not generated adoption of new regulation/legislation 
 
H2: There is a significant difference in adoption of regulation/legislation between devel-
oped and developing countries 
HO: There is not a significant difference in adoption of regulation/legislation between de-
veloped and developing countries 
5.3.2 Collection of Data 
Due to limitations of time the analysis is restricted to a sample size of 63 countries.
33
 These 
are strategically selected based on region, availability of data, and GNI. Consequently, 
there may be some selection bias which could influence the result, but given a transparent 
process - and availability of the information gathered, the data is verifiable. The selection is 
representative of the different regions, and the balance of wealth; within the region and 
globally. All countries are members of the FWCTC.  
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Data has been collected from different existing databases. Information on legislation was 
accessed at Tobacco Control Laws (2015), as they have systematically reviewed legislation 
on tobacco in all but 13 of the states in this analysis. Further, they hold data on legislation 
in the remaining 13, allowing for counting and classifying the development. Data on GNI 
was collected from the World Bank (2015c) database, while data on HDI and Mean Years 
of Education was collected from the UNDP (2014). To measure democracy, the analysis 
uses Freedom House (2015), as it was the only measure of democracy which holds infor-
mation on all the countries, and for every year except those prior to 1972.  
 
Relying on a second party analysis of legislation raises some issues. However, due to the 
time constraint of this project this was chosen as the preferable alternative as it allows for a 
comparable analysis of regulations. Further, as data for the different variables are collected 
from one source, it is easy to reproduce and is more likely to be internally consistent. Using 
data from the UNDP and the World Bank may be less problematic than Tobacco Control 
Laws as these are the result of a global development of indicators with standardized meth-
ods. Further, they have readily accessible documents on method of collection and analysis. 
Freedom House has been criticized amongst other things, for being politicized. However, if 
one is aware of the criticism and a potential bias, it is an acceptable indicator for compari-
son as the aim is not to assess democracy in itself.  
5.4 Findings 
Graph 3 shown below visualizes the growth in domestic regulation on tobacco control. The 
first line marks the year 1999, when the work on the FWCTC was initiated. The second 
line marks the year 2005, the year the treaty entered into force. Consistent with the findings 
of Wipfli and Huang (2011), there appears to be an increase in legislation and regulations 
in the drafting process of the FWCTC. Further, there is a rapid increase in legislation fol-
lowing the entry into force of the convention. Although it is a very recent trend, the rapid 
expansion seems to be slowing down. The cause of an eventual slowdown is not clear. Ob-
serving the increase in legislation and regulation it might indicate that countries have 
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adapted their regulation to comply with the treaty and that therefore the need for adopting 
new legislation lessens. However, this is highly speculative.  
 
 
 
Graph 3: Growth in International Legislation and Regulation on Tobacco. Cumulative number of regula-
tions/legislation by year 
The slow-down may be seen in conjunction with the third line, marking the year 2011. In 
2010 Philip Morris brought Uruguay to arbitration at the International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
34
 and in 2012 Philip Morris brought Australia to 
arbitration at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
35
 following domestic trials. The 
reason for the inclusion of the line is to see if there are indications of a chilling effect fol-
lowing the arbitration cases. A chilling effect is understood as neglecting to introduce new 
laws or regulations due to the fear of counter law suits. The response of Philip Morris can 
be seen as a backlash to the expansion of domestic legislation. Already in 2003 a senior 
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executive expressed concern that work on the FWCTC “has had a significant influence on 
us, simply because it has accelerated the pace of regulation in individual countries” (Davies 
2003 in Wipfli and Huang 2011:108). 
 
A test for correlation, shown in Table 4, confirms the observed development. It shows a 
significant relationship between the two, supporting the assumption that the increase in 
domestic regulation correlates to ratification. The rate reveals that ratification increases the 
chance of development of new regulation by 22.6%.  
 
 
Table 4: Correlation Domestic Legislation - Ratification 
As the correlation between domestic legislation and ratification is strong, a test was done to 
check whether states that had adopted legislation prior to the negotiation on the FWCTC, 
continued to adopt legislation after the work on the treaty was initiated. Additionally, tests 
were run on whether there was a link between existing legislation and adoption of regula-
tions following the convention’s entry into force. In line with the findings of Wipfli and 
Huang, and visible from Graph 3, there was an increase in regulation/legislation following 
the start of negotiation. However, when tested for whether or not the state had adopted leg-
islation prior to negotiations, the assumption was somewhat weakened as almost all of the 
states in the sample adopted regulation between 1990 and 1998.
36
 Only one state has not 
                                                 
 
36
 See Annex III. 
63 
 
adopted regulation, and only two states adopted one or less following 1998. Additionally, 
only three states have yet to adopt regulation following the entry into force of the FWCTC.  
Further, the regression analysis reveals that ratification does impact adoption of regulation 
and legislation on tobacco control, explaining 5.1% of the variance. The general trend ap-
pears to be that countries adopt an increasing amount of regulations and legislation follow-
ing their ratification of the treaty. Introducing control variables to the analysis adds little to 
the understanding of the development as most are not statistically significant. The only 
independent variable that is statistically significant is GNI. GNI explains 4.8% of the vari-
ance, indicating that an increase in GNI increases the likelihood of domestic legislation.
37
 
Additionally, level of democracy, while not statistically significant at the 0.01 or 0.05 lev-
els, may influence development of regulation; with more democratic countries being prone 
to hold higher protections.
38
 However, to get a more comprehensive understanding of the 
impact of the FWCTC, more research is necessary. 
 
When tested against each other, the independent variables behave consistent with expecta-
tions on income group, mean years of schooling, level of democracy, and HDI. Consistent 
with expectations refers to observations on the relationship between GNI, democracy, and 
HDI in international ratings. This indicates that these are modelled correctly, but have no 
significant impact on why states develop national legislation. With regards to the impact on 
the overall analysis, this finding of no connection strengthens the assumption of influence 
and importance of the FWCTC. 
5.5 Implications 
What is interesting about the findings is the strong link between ratification and adoption of 
legislation and/or regulation. Visible in all income groups and regions - despite differences 
in GNI, mean years of education, or human development, out of the measured variables the 
FWCTC appears to be a significant driver of the development of new domestic legislation. 
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Combining the findings here with those of Wipfli and Huang (2011) further strengthens the 
assumption. Consequently, one can establish that in the first alternative hypothesis, the null 
hypothesis is disproved, as the FWCTC does appear to have an impact on the development 
of new legislation and/or regulation. Further, the null hypothesis in the second alternative 
hypothesis is not disproved, as there is limited evidence that supports the assumed differ-
ence in adoption. 
 
In the debate on the global treaty this can support the argument of those in favor of a uni-
versal treaty, but also those in favor of a sectorial agreement. As the form of regulation is a 
treaty, those who back the work on a global universal treaty will arguably find support for 
the argument of increase in protection with hard law. However, as the FWCTC is a sectori-
al treaty with global reach, one could argue that a universal treaty will not have the same 
effect as it has to cover all sectors. Reflecting on the existing global human rights treaties, 
and the debate on their effectiveness, one might find more support for specific regulations 
which are more easily enforced.  
 
What becomes apparent from the data, due to the limitations of the model to explain the 
variance in adoption, is that much is connected to domestic sphere as anticipated by Hille-
brecht (2014) and Simmons (2009). However, as quantification of domestic or sociological 
factors can be challenging it is difficult to include these factors in the analysis. Instead one 
should rely on qualitative observations to understand some of the influence of these exter-
nal factors. A relevant study on smoking/tobacco regulation was done in the USA by Ka-
gan and Skolnick (1993). They find that securing compliance with new regulations on 
smoking in public places was surprisingly uncomplicated to implement. The link to public 
health and the development of “norms on civility” (Kagan and Skolnick 1993:79) facilitat-
ed the simplicity of implementing regulations on smoking. Given that the FWCTC was 
drafted and adopted by the WHO, the link to public health issues and policies is clear. Do-
mestic movement on accepting smoking as a health issue may further have influenced the 
impact of the treaty. As the findings reveal, almost all countries had adopted regulations on 
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tobacco control prior to the treaty, the treaty thus may have become a tool to further im-
plement and secure a general approach.  
 
On the diffusion of norms, the existence of regulation prior to the negotiation and adoption 
of the convention may have facilitated the continued strength of its protections. As the con-
vention was established following actions of early movers this can to a degree be viewed as 
international pressure enhancing domestic protections. As such, the international move on 
addressing smoking as a public health issue may have been key to the success of the con-
vention as a combined effort against tobacco production and consumption. Consequently, 
the convention can be part of a norm cascade (Wipfli and Huang 2011). Through creating 
an international institutional framework, one is enhancing compliant behavior. The impact 
of the establishment of the institutional framework can be seen through the countermove-
ment of tobacco corporations, generating opposition in international channels.  
 
Despite the success of the convention, following the international arbitration cases driven 
by Philip Morris, there could appear to be a growing backlash against the strengthening of 
regulations. As discussed in the previous chapters, balancing different spheres of interna-
tional law can be challenging, and it will be interesting to see how countries react to the 
threat of corporate suits against health policy. The FWCTC may be a tool in this context as 
it can support an argument of non-discriminatory measures based on the framework almost 
universally accepted to improve public health and human rights. In fact, in the pending case 
of Philip Morris v. Uruguay, the FWCTC has been explicitly mentioned by Uruguay.
39
 
From a human rights perspective, the convention could consequently play an important role 
in securing the protection of public policies from international lawsuits, enhancing the pro-
tection of human rights. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
The FWCTC has been an important driver of the development of new legislation on tobac-
co control. Legislation and regulation has been developed in a majority of countries follow-
ing the entry into force or domestic ratification of the treaty, regardless of state characteris-
tics. Although the data should not be considered as an ultimate test of the effect of the con-
vention, it does strengthen the argument for continued work on a global treaty. If the cur-
rent indication of regulatory slow-down continues, this could strengthen the observation on 
the importance of the FWCTC as its introduction triggered massive adaption, but further 
research is necessary. The development and implications of the current investment arbitra-
tions brought by Phillip Morris against Australia and Uruguay should be considered in this 
context as these may contribute to regulatory chills. Further quantitative research could 
assess the outcome of the treaty measured by a proxy for success or another dependent var-
iable, e.g. smoking rates. The data could also be reviewed against qualitative reports on 
progress from the WHO, to see if the increase in regulations has the desired effect on pub-
lic health. 
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 Implications – Concluding Remarks 6
This paper has examined the current system regulating state and corporate behavior with 
regards to human rights. The aim of the analysis was to identify strengths and weaknesses 
of the system and use the observations to comment on how the international society should 
proceed when working for stronger human rights protections. As chapter three concludes, 
one can establish that there is a protection gap. Efforts should be made to close this gap. 
While the UNGPs may already have made an important contribution through expanding the 
scope of rights which merit corporate protection, it appears as if a harder regulatory system 
is necessary. In chapter four, the analysis showed that while corporate driven regulations 
may entail greater likelihood of corporate adoption it does not secure greater rights protec-
tion. Similarly, the voluntary scope of the UNGPs can have the consequence of limiting the 
diffusion of norms as it is not sufficiently clear on the relationship between corporations 
and states. As shown with the legislative success of the FWCTC, an international treaty 
may have a large effect on domestic change, which will be imperative in changing actual 
behavior. But a treaty is not an easy way out. Not only will there be challenges in drafting 
and securing adoption, but clarification issues regarding regulation of corporation, the 
scope of state responsibility with regards to MNC, balancing spheres of international law, 
and the scope of rights to be protected. As experience with the UN Norms reveals, this will 
most likely be a challenging exercise.  
 
Before further addressing implications of the findings, some limitations of the analysis 
should be considered. The approach of the article was to quantitatively assess the state of 
the current system on human rights and business. Inherently in choosing a quantitative 
method, the depth of the analysis is limited. Consequently, variations may have declined 
through operationalization of concepts and rights. In order to get a more in depth under-
standing of the variations, the analysis could be complemented by more qualitative studies 
into specific sectors or sub-sectors. Beyond the methodological constraints, the timeframe 
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of the issues addressed is quite narrow. Given what seems to be an important impact of the 
ILO Fundamental Principles of Rights at Work it is difficult to fully incorporate the fore-
shadowed impact of the UNGPs with what is claimed to be a more holistic approach. Addi-
tionally, one has to consider that existing regulation does not automatically imply compli-
ance. Assessing the behavior of states and corporations against the law will add insight to 
understanding how to best approach and close the gap.  
 
However, while we are waiting to see if and how the UNGPs may impact current or new 
standards, the need for increasing the protection of rights is imminent. While work on a 
possible treaty may be challenging, the analysis has shown little support for arguments 
against it. The current system has a protection gap, and the necessity of clarification of re-
sponsibility and a uniform framework can address these challenges. Consequently, one 
could argue that it boils down to a question of what the aim of the treaty is. If the aim is to 
effectively create protections for right holders, the preferred option might be to create sec-
torial standards which are more specific and therefore perhaps more easy to put into action. 
This is in line with the critique that has been raised on the human rights treaties and the 
challenge of operationalizing protections (Merry 2011). Within the UN system, and visible 
through the UNGPs, there is a push for development of indicators highlighting the added 
value of operationalization and measuring progress (Chan 2007; HRI 2008). However, if 
the aim is to simultaneously create a global framework the impact of the FWCTC on the 
development of new legislation is also important. Following the arguments of diffusion of 
norms (Gillies 2011), one could consider that through creating an international institutional 
framework, the rights of those affected may increase. It would allow for clarification of 
state and corporate responsibility, and contribute to the discussion on the scope of corpo-
rate duties. Further, as shown with the FWCTC, it could generate a new norm cascade that 
may significantly improve the protection of human rights.  
 
As the current battle between Philip Morris and Australia and Uruguay reveals, balancing 
the different regulatory regimes will be important. With regards to business, this may be 
particularly linked to the development of the investment regime due to the breadth of inves-
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tor rights (and the financial crisis in 2008). Additionally, the ever increasing global market 
calls for a universal framework. Here, a treaty would be valuable. A solution could be to 
combine the two alternatives and create a global universal treaty which establishes the 
framework on how state and corporate duties are to be balanced both between themselves, 
and between the different legislative regimes, and use sectorial treaties to establish specific 
minimum protections based on fundamental human rights. This would ensure a more uni-
form approach to the issue of corporate human rights violations, which should be in the 
interest of both states and corporations. For corporations it enhances predictability through 
a clear expression of expected behavior as well as binding obligations, while for states it 
may enable new policies.  
 
To sum up, work on the global, universal treaty appears to be an important step to ensure 
increased human rights protection. Not only can it ensure universal protection, but it can 
clarify obligations of the different parties and balance spheres of international law. In the 
reality of hyperglobalization (Rodrik 2011), this will be important. As the issue in question 
is human rights violations, human rights protection must remain the primary concern. Giv-
en the human rights focus, continued work on a global treaty appears to be a preferable 
option, perhaps particularly if accompanied by sectorial specifications. This combination 
will make the global system simpler to use and contribute to closing the gap between state, 
corporate, and individual rights and duties.  
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Annex I – Chapter Three 
 
3.3.4 Sectors: 
Sectors included in database, those with standards in bold: 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 
Construction 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
Transportation and storage 
Accommodation and food service activities 
Information and communication 
Financial and insurance activities 
Real estate activities 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 
Administrative and support service activities 
Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 
Education 
Human health and social work activities  
Arts, entertainment and recreation 
Other service activities  
Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing ac-
tivities of households for own use 
Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies 
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3.3.6 Human Rights Treaties 
 
Correlations 
 Entry Into Force Strength Treaties Nr. Of Treaties HR Inclusion 
Entry Into 
Force 
Pearson Correlation 1 -,145 ,471
**
 ,301
**
 -,014 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,214 ,000 ,007 ,904 
N 78 75 78 78 74 
Strength 
Pearson Correlation -,145 1 -,099 -,087 -,075 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,214  ,387 ,444 ,524 
N 75 79 79 79 74 
Treaties 
Pearson Correlation ,471
**
 -,099 1 ,153 ,438
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,387  ,169 ,000 
N 78 79 82 82 77 
Nr. Of  
Treaties 
Pearson Correlation ,301
**
 -,087 ,153 1 -,014 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,007 ,444 ,169  ,904 
N 78 79 82 82 77 
HR Inclusion 
Pearson Correlation -,014 -,075 ,438
**
 -,014 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,904 ,524 ,000 ,904  
N 74 74 77 77 77 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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3.3.7 Enforcement 
 
Complaints 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative Per-
cent 
Valid No 68 82,9 82,9 82,9 
Yes 14 17,1 17,1 100,0 
Total 82 100,0 100,0  
 
Certification 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative Per-
cent 
Valid No 50 61,0 61,0 61,0 
Yes 32 39,0 39,0 100,0 
Total 82 100,0 100,0  
 
Reporting 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative Per-
cent 
Valid No 44 53,7 53,7 53,7 
Yes 38 46,3 46,3 100,0 
Total 82 100,0 100,0  
 
IndependenceReporting 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Yes 10 12,2 34,5 34,5 
Partially 6 7,3 20,7 55,2 
No 13 15,9 44,8 100,0 
Total 29 35,4 100,0  
Missing System 53 64,6   
Total 82 100,0   
 
82 
 
 
Correlations 
 EntryIntoForce Reporting Complaints Certification Scope Strength 
EntryIntoForce Pearson Correla-
tion 
1 ,234
*
 ,147 ,348
**
 ,102 -,050 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,034 ,188 ,001 ,360 ,663 
N 82 82 82 82 82 79 
Reporting Pearson Correla-
tion 
,234
*
 1 ,163 ,159 ,129 ,092 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,034  ,143 ,154 ,249 ,419 
N 82 82 82 82 82 79 
Complaints Pearson Correla-
tion 
,147 ,163 1 ,102 -,019 ,000 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,188 ,143  ,361 ,866 1,000 
N 82 82 82 82 82 79 
Certification Pearson Correla-
tion 
,348
**
 ,159 ,102 1 ,239
*
 ,094 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,001 ,154 ,361  ,030 ,410 
N 82 82 82 82 82 79 
Scope Pearson Correla-
tion 
,102 ,129 -,019 ,239
*
 1 -,122 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,360 ,249 ,866 ,030  ,284 
N 82 82 82 82 82 79 
Strength Pearson Correla-
tion 
-,050 ,092 ,000 ,094 -,122 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,663 ,419 1,000 ,410 ,284  
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Annex II – Chapter Four 
4.3.1 Corporate Drafting – Corporate Adopting 
 
4.3.2 Certification 
 
Certification – HRLanguage 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,342
a
 ,117 ,106 ,471 
a. Predictors: (Constant), CorporateDrafting 
Correlations 
 Sector Certification HRLanguage 
Sector Pearson Correlation 1 -,184 ,191 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,215 ,288 
N 47 47 33 
Certification Pearson Correlation -,184 1 -,322
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,215  ,009 
N 47 82 65 
HRLanguage Pearson Correlation ,191 -,322
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,288 ,009  
N 33 65 65 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,322
a
 ,104 ,089 ,531 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Certification 
84 
 
Annex III – Chapter Five 
Selection of states 
Regions
40
 High Income
41
 Middle Income Low Income 
Region of the  
Americas 
Canada, Chile, 
Uruguay 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Ri-
ca, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Jamaica, 
Panama, Peru, Suriname, 
Venezuela 
 
European Region France, Iceland, 
Ireland, Israel, 
Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Russia, 
Poland, UK 
Turkey, Ukraine, Serbia,  
Georgia, Romania, Hungary, 
Moldova 
 
African Region Equatorial 
Guinea 
Algeria, Congo, Mauritius,  
Namibia, Senegal, Sey-
chelles, South Africa 
Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Chad, 
Kenya, Mada-
gascar, Niger, 
Tanzania 
Eastern Mediter-
ranean Region 
Saudi Arabia, 
UAE 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Tu-
nisia 
 
South-East Asia 
Region 
 Thailand, India Bangladesh 
Western Pacific 
Region 
Australia, Bru-
nei Darussalam, 
Japan 
China, Fiji, Malaysia,  
Philippines, Tonga, Viet 
Nam 
 
                                                 
 
40
 WHO Regions. 
41
 World Bank rating. 
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Ratification, GNI, Democracy 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,230
a
 ,053 ,050 ,933 
2 ,290
b
 ,084 ,079 ,918 
3 ,290
c
 ,084 ,077 ,920 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Ratification 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Ratification, GNI 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Ratification, GNI, Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANOVA
a
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 19,019 1 19,019 21,858 ,000
b
 
Residual 341,953 393 ,870   
Total 360,972 394    
2 Regression 30,347 2 15,173 17,990 ,000
c
 
Residual 330,626 392 ,843   
Total 360,972 394    
3 Regression 30,361 3 10,120 11,969 ,000
d
 
Residual 330,611 391 ,846   
Total 360,972 394    
a. Dependent Variable: DomesticLeg 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Ratification 
c. Predictors: (Constant), Ratification, GNI 
d. Predictors: (Constant), Ratification, GNI, Democracy 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized Coef-
ficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1,340 ,067  19,858 ,000 
Ratification ,439 ,094 ,230 4,675 ,000 
2 (Constant) 1,241 ,072  17,274 ,000 
Ratification ,368 ,094 ,193 3,898 ,000 
GNI 1,218E-5 ,000 ,181 3,665 ,000 
3 (Constant) 1,257 ,143  8,778 ,000 
Ratification ,370 ,095 ,193 3,886 ,000 
GNI 1,189E-5 ,000 ,177 2,954 ,003 
Democracy -,005 ,035 -,008 -,129 ,897 
a. Dependent Variable: DomesticLeg 
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Regulation/Legislation Periodic 
GNI 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,220
a
 ,048 ,046 ,932 
a. Predictors: (Constant), GNI 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1,400 ,060  23,528 ,000 
GNI 1,480E-5 ,000 ,220 4,484 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: DomesticLeg 
Correlations 
 
OneBe-
Be-
foreNinetyEi
ght TwoOrMore OneAfter 
TwoOrMore
After OneEntryInto 
OneBeforeNinetyEight Pearson Correlation 1 ,574** ,129 ,003 ,078 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 ,314 ,982 ,543 
N 63 63 63 63 63 
TwoOrMore Pearson Correlation ,574** 1 ,074 ,106 ,130 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  ,564 ,410 ,308 
N 63 63 63 63 63 
OneAfter Pearson Correlation ,129 ,074 1 ,701** ,568** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,314 ,564  ,000 ,000 
N 63 63 63 63 63 
TwoOrMoreAfter Pearson Correlation ,003 ,106 ,701** 1 ,810** 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,982 ,410 ,000  ,000 
N 63 63 63 63 63 
OneEntryInto Pearson Correlation ,078 ,130 ,568** ,810** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,543 ,308 ,000 ,000  
N 63 63 63 63 63 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Annex IV – Coding Manual 
 
Coding Manual Global BHR Standards 
Unit – Standard  
Definitions: 
Global BHR Standard: A standard which can be explicitly applied to the business sector 
holding specific responsibility for corporations. This excludes international covenants on 
human rights, as they are only applicable to states and individuals. Global BHR standards 
include a reference to social responsibility, distinguishing it from other corporate regula-
tions.  
International Standard: Standards which in theory are not limited to a sole or unilateral 
jurisdiction, e.g. the EU. Exclusively bilateral standards are also disregarded as internation-
al. 
Variables: 
I. Name 
What is the name of the standard? 
Open ended 
II. Entry into force 
Date of entry into force 
III. Subject to Revision 
Has this version been subjected to revisions? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
IV. Revision 
Is it a revision of an existing standard? 
2. No 
3. Yes 
V. Last Revision 
Is it the last revision of an existing standard? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
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VI. Adoption 
How many signatories were there to the standard at the time of adoption? 
Open ended 
VII. Formal Adherence 
How many signatories are there to the standard as of December 31, 2014? 
Open ended 
Nature of the standard 
VIII. Scope 
What is the scope of the standard? 
1. Global – Universal  
2. Global – Sectorial  
3. Global – Sub-Sectorial  
4. Regional – Universal  
5. Regional – Sectorial  
6. Regional – Sub-Sectorial 
7. Other 
IX. Sector 
What Sector does the standard cover? (List from 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=27) 
1. Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
2. Mining and quarrying 
3. Manufacturing 
4. Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
5. Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 
6. Construction 
7. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
8. Transportation and storage 
9. Accommodation and food service activities 
10. Information and communication 
11. Financial and insurance activities 
12. Real estate activities 
13. Professional, scientific and technical activities 
14. Administrative and support service activities 
15. Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 
16. Education 
17. Human health and social work activities  
18. Arts, entertainment and recreation 
19. Other service activities  
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20. Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-
producing activities of households for own use 
21. Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies 
X. Sub-Sector 
What Sub-Sector does the standard cover? (List from 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=27) 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
1. Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities 
2. Forestry and logging 
3. Fishing and aquaculture 
Mining and quarrying 
4. Mining of coal and lignite 
5. Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas 
6. Mining of metal ores 
7. Other mining and quarrying 
8. Mining support service activities 
Manufacturing 
9. Manufacture of food products 
10. Manufacture of beverages 
11. Manufacture of tobacco products 
12. Manufacture of textiles 
13. Manufacture of wearing apparel 
14. Manufacture of leather and related products 
15. Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
16. Manufacture of paper and paper products 
17. Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
18. Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 
19. Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
20. Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical prepara-
tions 
21. Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 
22. Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
23. Manufacture of basic metals 
24. Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
25. Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 
26. Manufacture of electrical equipment 
27. Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
28. Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
29. Manufacture of other transport equipment 
30. Manufacture of furniture 
31. Other manufacturing 
32. Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
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Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
33. Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 
34. Water collection, treatment and supply 
35. Sewerage 
36. Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery 
37. Remediation activities and other waste management services 
Construction 
38. Construction of buildings 
39. Civil engineering 
40. Specialized construction activities 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
41. Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
42. Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
43. Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
Transportation and storage 
44. Land transport and transport via pipelines 
45. Water transport 
46. Air transport 
47. Warehousing and support activities for transportation 
48. Postal and courier activities 
Accommodation and food service activities 
49. Accommodation 
50. Food and beverage service activities 
Information and communication 
51. Publishing activities 
52. Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound record-
ing and music publishing activities 
53. Programming and broadcasting activities 
54. Telecommunications 
55. Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 
56. Information service activities 
Financial and insurance activities 
57. Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding 
58. Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social secu-
rity 
59. Activities auxiliary to financial service and insurance activities 
Real estate activities 
60. Real estate activities 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 
61. Legal and accounting activities 
62. Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities 
63. Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis 
64. Scientific research and development 
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65. Advertising and market research 
66. Other professional, scientific and technical activities 
67. Veterinary activities 
Administrative and support service activities 
68. Rental and leasing activities 
69. Employment activities 
70. Travel agency, tour operator, reservation service and related activities 
71. Security and investigation activities 
72. Services to buildings and landscape activities 
73. Office administrative, office support and other business support activities 
Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 
74. Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 
Education 
75. Education 
Human Health and social work activities 
76. Human health activities 
77. Residential care activities 
78. Social work activities without accommodation 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 
79. Creative, arts and entertainment activities 
80. Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities 
81. Gambling and betting activities 
82. Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities 
Other service activities 
83. Activities of membership organizations 
84. Repair of computers and personal and household goods 
85. Other personal service activities 
Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-
producing activities of households for own use 
86. Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel 
87. Undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of private house-
holds for own use 
Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies 
88. Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies 
XI. Strength 
What is the strength of the standard? 
1. Binding 
2. Voluntary 
3. Combination 
4. Other 
XII. Competing standards 
Are there competing standards? 
0. No 
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1. Yes 
XIII. Reporting 
Is there a reporting mechanism? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
XIV. Independence Reporting 
Is the reporting mechanism independent? 
1. Yes 
2. Partially 
3. No 
98. Unknown 
XV. Complaints 
Does the standard include a complaint mechanism? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
XVI. Independence Complaints 
Is the reporting mechanism independent? 
1. Yes 
2. Partially 
3. No 
XVII. Transparency Proceedings 
Are the complaint proceedings transparent? 
1. Yes 
2. Partially 
3. No 
XVIII. Treaties 
Does the standard refer to any treaties? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
XIX. Treaty Name 
Which treaties does the standard refer to? 
1. (UDHR) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
2. (ECHR) European Convention on Human Rights 
3. (ACHPR) African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
4. (ACHPR OP) Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on 
the Rights of Women in Africa 
5. (ICCPR) The UN Covenant on Civil and Political rights 
6. (ICESCR) The UN Covenant on Economic, social and Cultural rights 
7. (CRC) Convention on the Rights of the Child 
8. (CEDAW) Convention on the Elimination of discrimination Against women 
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9. (CAT) Convention Against Torture 
10. (ESC) European Social Charter (Original or Revised) 
11. (BELEM DO PARA) Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punish-
ment and Eradication of Violence Against Women 
12. (CAIRO) Cairo Declaration 
13. (BEIJING) Beijing Declaration 1995 – Fourth World Conference on Women 
14. (YOGYAKARTA) Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International 
Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity 
15. (ILO) International Labour Organisation Declaration on Fundamental Princi-
ples and Rights at Work 
16. (DRIP) UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
17. (CERD) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
18. (CMW) Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families 
19. (CRPD) Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities 
XX. Business and Human Rights standards  
Which BHR standards does it refer to? 
1. UNGPs 
2. OECD guidelines 
3. FSC 
4. Global Compact 
5. UN Norms 
6. CCC 
7. ETI Base Code 
8. GRI 
9. Fair Labor Association 
10. ILO Tripartite 
11. Other 
XXI. Human Rights Inclusion 
How much of the Human Rights regime does the standard cover? 
1. None or only specific 
2. Partial 
3. Full 
Adopting 
XXII. Number Adopting 
How many signatories are there to the standard? 
Open ended 
XXIII. Adopting Parties 
Which parties have adopted the standard? 
1. States 
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2. Corporations 
3. IGOs 
4. CSOs/NGOs 
5. Other 
Adherence 
XXIV. Adherence 
Can parties adhere to the standard? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
XXV. Adherence Number 
How many signatories adhere to the standard? 
Open ended 
XXVI. Adopting Parties 
Which parties adhere to the standard? 
1. States 
2. Corporations 
3. IGOs 
4. CSOs/NGOs 
5. Other 
Certification 
XXVII. Certification 
Does the standard include a certification scheme? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
XXVIII. Reporting 
Does the certification scheme demand reporting? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
XXIX. Independence 
Is the certification scheme independent? 
1. Yes 
2. Partially 
3. No 
4. Unknown 
XXX. External 
Does the certification scheme include external verification? 
0. No 
96 
 
1. Yes 
Drafting 
XXXI. Parties 
Who were involved in the drafting? 
1. States 
2. Corporations 
3. CSOs 
4. IGOs 
5. Other 
98. Unknown 
XXXII. Drafting Parties List 
List of drafting parties 
Open ended 
XXXIII. Location 
Where was the standard drafted? 
Open ended 
XXXIV. Transparency 
Was the drafting of the standard transparent? 
1. Yes 
2. Partially 
3. No 
Human Rights 
XXXV. Human Rights List 
Which human rights does the standard refer to? 
1. Self-determination 
2. Non-discrimination 
3. Work 
4. Fair wages and decent living 
5. Join trade unions 
6. Social security 
7. Family 
8. Adequate standard of living 
9. Food (free from hunger) 
10. Health 
11. Education 
12. Life 
13. Cruel, degrading or inhuman treatment 
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14. Slavery 
15. Arbitrary detention 
16. Dignity 
17. Freedom of movement 
18. Fair trial 
19. Access to justice 
20. Privacy 
21. Freedom of Religion 
22. Freedom of expression 
23. Freedom of assembly 
24. Freedom of association 
25. Seek Asylum 
26. Right to marry 
27. Own property 
28. Right to Leisure 
29. Best interest of the child 
30. Child labor 
31. Minority rights 
32. Indigenous rights 
33. Women’s rights 
XXXVI. Reference 
Does the standard refer to human rights? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
XXXVII. Substantive 
Does the standard include substantive responsibilities or obligations concerning 
human rights beyond a reference? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
XXXVIII. Human Rights Language 
How is the human rights responsibility framed? 
1. Must/Shall 
2. Requires 
3. Should 
4. Could 
5. May 
6. Other 
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Sectorial Information 
XXXIX. Timing 
Did the standard enter into force prior to a legal or policy development at country 
level? 
1. No 
2. Yes 
3. Other 
98. Unknown 
XL. Exposure 
Is the sector exposed to consumer pressure? 
1. Yes 
2. Partially  
3. No 
98. Unknown 
XLI. Traceable 
Are the products traceable? 
0. No 
1. Yes 
XLII. Market Size 
How large is the sectorial turnover? In USD 
XLIII. Standard Size 
What percentage of this turnover does the standard include? 
Fragmentation 
XLIV. Production Fragmentation 
Is the production fragmented? 
0. No (concentrated) 
1. Yes 
XLV. Distribution Fragmentation 
Is the distribution fragmented? 
0. No (concentrated) 
1. Yes 
 
XLVI. Retail Fragmentation 
Is the retail fragmented? 
0. No (concentrated) 
1. Yes 
 
